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They came for the Communists
and I didn't object for I wasn't a Communist;
They came for the Socialists
and I didn't object for I wasn't a Socialist;
They came for the labour leaders
and I didn't object for I wasn't a labour leader;
They came for the Jews
and I didn't object for I wasn't a Jew;
Then they came for me
and there was no one left to object.
Martin Niemiller, German Protestant Pastor (1892-1984)**
INTRODUCTION
Articles 2 to 5 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia (International Tribunal),' adopted by the
United Nations Security Council upon recommendation of the U.N.
Secretary-General, 2 deal with the competence, ratione materiae, of the
International Tribunal to try serious violations of international humani-
tarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since
** The text is found in Yad Va-shem, the Holocaust Memorial Museum in Jerusalem,
Israel.
1. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolu-
tion 808 (1993) [hereinafter Secretary-General's Report], Annex (Statute of the International
Tribunal), arts. 2-5, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1163, 1192-94 (1993).
2. Secretary-General's Report, supra note 1, para. 48, 32 I.L.M. at 1173.
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199. 3 It is no mere coincidence that the list of articles relating to the
subject-matter competence of the International Tribunal opens with an
article which deals with grave breaches of the four Geneva Conventions
for the Protection of Victims of War of 1949 (1949 Geneva Conventions
or Conventions).4 Grave breaches of the Conventions constitute serious
violations of the very core of international humanitarian law.
The system of grave breaches, established in the Conventions, is the
focal point of the enforcement mechanism of international humanitarian
law in general and of the Conventions in particular. It is therefore
surprising that very little has been written to date about this system.
This article is intended to fill that gap by discussing the repression -
the prohibition, prosecution, and adjudication - of grave breaches of
the Conventions. The article's main purpose is to chart and map the
basic contours of the terrain of an area which despite its vast sig-
nificance has not been adequately and systematically explored. It is thus
that the article pursues a predominantly descriptive theme. Indeed, such
a descriptive project seems necessary for any further informed discus-
3. Article 2 deals with grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949; Article 3
focuses on violations of the laws or customs of war; Article 4 deals with genocide; and
finally Article 5 includes a list of crimes considered to be crimes against humanity. See
Statute of the International Tribunal, supra note 1, arts. 2-5, 32 I.L.M. at 1192-94.
4. The four conventions are: Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter
First Geneva Convention]; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded,
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85
[hereinafter Second Geneva Convention]; Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]; Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S.
287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention] [collectively the Conventions]. All of the
Conventions were signed at Geneva on August 12, 1949.
Article 2 of the Statute of the International Tribunal, entitled "Grave Breaches of the
Geneva Conventions of 1949," provides that:
The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons committing or
ordering to be committed grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, namely the following acts against persons or property protected under the
provisions of the relevant Geneva Convention:
(a) wilful killing;
(b) torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments;
(c) wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health;
(d) extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by
military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly;
(e) compelling a prisoner of war or a civilian to serve in the forces of a
hostile power;
(f) wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or a civilian of the rights of fair and
regular trial;
(g) unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a civilian;
(h) taking civilians as hostages.
Statute of the International Tribunal, supra note 1, art. 2, 32 I.L.M. at 1192.
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sion and evaluation of the grave breaches system in the specific context
of the proceedings before the International Tribunal and of this system's
usefulness as an enforcement mechanism of international humanitarian
law.
The system for repression of grave breaches was established after
almost a century in which there had been no working penal sanctions
system for the enforcement of international instruments related to armed
conflicts. Part I of this article briefly outlines this background history,
spanning a period between 1864 and the end of World War II.
Part II delineates the structure of the grave breaches system in the
Conventions. Following a description of the obligations imposed upon
the High Contracting Parties (or Signatory States) and of the principle of
universal jurisdiction, the article examines two issues. First, is the grave
breaches system intended to impose direct responsibility upon in-
dividuals? Second, is there a place for an international tribunal under
this system? This part of the article concludes with a review of the
development of the concept of "grave breaches," which appeared for the
first time in the Conventions.
Part III concentrates on the actual content of each of the grave
breaches included in the Conventions, analyzing the specific elements of
the various violations that amount to grave breaches. This part of the
article deals with definitions of torture, inhuman treatment, deportations,
unlawful confinement, extensive destruction of property, and so forth.
Part IV examines whether the crime of rape may be considered a
grave breach of the Conventions despite the fact that it is not explicitly
mentioned as such in the Conventions. As explained in this part, there
are significant implications attached to a recognition of rape as a grave
breach along with its inclusion in the Statute of the International Tribu-
nal as a crime against humanity.
Part V briefly discusses the issue of penalties to be imposed on
persons found responsible for grave breaches of the Conventions. Part
VI examines the applicability of the system of repression of grave
breaches to the armed conflicts in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.
Finally, Part VII briefly explains the development of the grave
breaches system under Protocol V. The principal goal is to complete the
picture entitled "grave breaches" and show the direction of development
of international humanitarian law in this area.
5. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, U.N. Doc.
A/32/144/Annex 1 (1977), reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977) [hereinafter Protocol I].
[Vol. 16:783
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I. REPRESSION OF VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW - A BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW6
Not until 1906 did provisions dealing with repression of violations
and infractions appear in a legally binding international document in the
area of humanitarian law. The relevant documents on the laws of war,
such as the 1864 Geneva Convention7 and the series of Hague Conven-
tions of 1899 and 1907, did not include any penal provision for viola-
tions of their provisions,8 despite their prohibitive nature.'
Thus, the 1906 Geneva Convention, 0 which included an article on
the repression of abuse and infractions, was the first to deal with the
issue of repression. According to Article 28(1) of this Convention, the
Contracting Parties agreed, in case their domestic laws were insufficient,
to take steps to prevent abuse of the emblem of the Red Cross and to
repress certain infractions of the Convention." However, this provision,
which did not stipulate a mandatory compliance, did not trigger action
by the State Parties to the Convention.
After World War I, the Preliminary Peace Conference established a
commission on January 25, 1919 to inquire into "the responsibility of
6. For a few good overviews of the penal provisions in the area of international
humanitarian law, see, e.g., Yves Sandoz, Penal Aspects of International Humanitarian Law,
in 1 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 209 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1986). See also IV THE
GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949: COMMENTARY 583-87 (Jean S. Pictet ed.,
1952-58) [hereinafter GENEVA CONVENTIONS COMMENTARY]; Remigiusz Bierzanek, War
Crimes: History and Definition, in 3 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra, at 29; UNITED
NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES
COMMISSION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAWS OF WAR (1948).
7. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the
Field, Aug. 22, 1864, reprinted in DIETRICH SCHINDLER & JItf TOMAN, THE LAWS OF
ARMED CONFLICTS 279 (3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter 1864 Geneva Convention].
8. A partial exception is Convention (X) for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the
Principles of the Geneva Convention, Oct. 18, 1907, reprinted in SCHINDLER & TOMAN,
supra note 7, at 313. Mention may be made in this context of Article 3 of the Convention
(IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, reprinted in
SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 7, at 63. This article provides for an obligation to pay
compensation for violation of the regulations made under that Convention. This obligation is
directed at the state.
9. See United States v. List, 11 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG
MILITARY TRIBUNALS 757, 1252 (1950).
10. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armies in the Field, July 6, 1906, reprinted in SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 7, at 301
[hereinafter 1906 Geneva Convention].
11. 1906 Geneva Convention, supra note 10, art. 28(1). The infractions specified in
Article 28(1) - acts of robbery, ill treatment of the wounded and sick of the armies, and
wrongful use of the flag of the Red Cross - were those considered to be the most grave. See
Sandoz, Penal Aspects, supra note 6, at 213.
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the authors of the war" and the means of punishing them. One important
product of this commission was a list of violations of the laws of war.'2
In addition, Articles 227 to 230 of the Treaty of Versailles provided for
the punishment of Germans (including former Emperor Wilhelm II)
accused of committing acts in violation of the laws and customs of war
and for the extradition by the German government of some of its citi-
zens.13 Yet, for a variety of reasons, these articles were of very limited
practical significance. The Leipzig trials were the only tangible outcome
of these provisions, and a poor outcome they were; few persons were
brought to trial, the sentences imposed by the Court were light, and in
many cases the convicted persons did not serve out their sentences.
1 4
The 1929 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition
of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field [1929 Geneva Conven-
tion]' 5 followed the provisions laid down in the 1906 Geneva Conven-
tion regarding repression of abuses and infractions, but it included an
important innovation in the existing system. Based on the experience of
states' failure to implement voluntarily the dictates of Article 28(1) of
12. Sandoz, Penal Aspects, supra note 6, at 214, 226. The list includes: murders and
massacres; systematic terrorism; torture of civilians; deliberate starvation of civilians; rape;
abduction of girls and women for the purpose of enforced prostitution; deportation of civil-
ians; internment of civilians under inhuman conditions; forced labor of civilians or others in
connection with the military operations of the enemy; usurpation of sovereignty during
military occupation; compulsory enlistment of soldiers among the inhabitants of occupied
territory; attempts to denationalize the inhabitants of occupied territory; pillage; confiscation
of property; exaction of illegitimate or of exorbitant contributions and requisitions; debase-
ment of currency and issue of spurious currency; imposition of collective penalties; wanton
devastation and destruction of property; deliberate bombardment of undefended places;
wanton destruction of religious, charitable, education and historic buildings and monuments;
destruction of merchant ships and passenger vessels without warning and without provision
for the safety of passengers and crew; destruction of fishing boats and of relief ships;
deliberate bombardment of hospitals; attack on and destruction of hospital ships; breach of
other rules relating to the Red Cross; use of deleterious and asphyxiating gases; use of
explosive or expanding bullets and other inhuman appliances; directions to give no quarter;
ill-treatment of wounded and prisoners of war; employment of prisoners of war on un-
authorized works; misuse of flags of truce; and poisoning of wells. Id. at 226.
13. Treaty of Peace with Germany (Treaty of Versailles), June 28, 1919, arts. 227-30, 2
Bevans 43, 136-37.
14. A list of 896 war criminals was submitted by the Allied governments to the German
government for prosecution. Originally, the intention had been to prosecute them before
military tribunals of the Allies. Eventually a compromise was struck, based on a German
proposal, which allowed trials before the German Supreme Court in Leipzig. The original list
was substantially cut down to include only 45 names. Moreover, only 12 were subsequently
tried, and only 6 were convicted. The final blow to the program to try war criminals was the
issuance of disproportionately light sentences, which in many cases were either not fully
served or not served at all. See, e.g., GERHARD VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONs 878 (6th
ed. 1992).
15. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
in Armies in the Field, July 27, 1929, 118 L.N.T.S. 303 [hereinafter 1929 Geneva Conven-
tion]. This Convention was the third version of the 1864 Geneva Convention (the second
version being the 1906 Geneva Convention).
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the 1906 Geneva Convention, Article 29 of the 1929 Geneva Conven-
tion imposed a mandatory obligation on the High Contracting Parties to
adopt the necessary measures for the repression, in time of war, of any
act contrary to the provisions of the Convention. 16 Yet, despite its man-
datory character, Article 29 failed to initiate a more rigorous im-
plementation by the Signatory States. Finally, both Geneva Conventions
of 192917 aimed to improve their implementation and application, by, for
example, instituting the mechanism of a Protecting Power and providing
for an inquiry in case an allegation is made that the Convention has
been breached.
The trials of war criminals following the end of World War II have
decisively reaffirmed the principle of individual responsibility for crimes
committed under international law, that is, that international law may
impose direct duties and obligations upon the individual. In the famous
words of the Nuremberg Tribunal, "[tihat international law imposes
duties and liabilities upon individuals as well as upon States has long
been recognized .... Crimes against international law are committed by
men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who
commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be en-
forced."' 8
The Charter of the International Military Tribunal (IMT)' 9 enumer-
ates three types of acts which are considered to be crimes coming within
the jurisdiction of the IMT and for which individual responsibility may
be incurred: crimes against peace, war crimes,20 and crimes against
16. 1929 Geneva Convention, supra note 15, art. 29, 118 L.N.T.S. at 329. A second
Geneva Convention signed on the same day, Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, July 27, 1929, 118 L.N.T.S. 343, did not include a similar provision.
17. See supra notes 15 and 16.
18. International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences, 41 AM. J.
INT'L L. 172, 220-21 (1947) [hereinafter Nuremberg Judgment].
19. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, Annex (Charter of the International Military Tribunal), 82
U.N.T.S. 279, 284 [hereinafter IMT Charter].
20. The category of "war crimes" under Article 6(b) of the IMT Charter refers to war
crimes stricto sensu. See IMT Charter, supra note 19, art. 6(b), 82 U.N.T.S. at 288. The broad
notion of "war crimes" includes all three categories of crimes mentioned in Article 6. The
specific content of the concept of "war crime" is not fixed; rather, it develops and evolves.
However, not every violation of the laws of war amounts to the level of a war crime: only
significant breaches of those laws might be considered as constituting a war crime. See, e.g.,
HILAIRE MCCOUBREY & NIGEL D. WHITE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT
335-36 (1992); Hans-Heinrich Jescheck, War Crimes, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 294, 294-95 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1981-90) [hereinafter ENCYCLOPE-
DIA 1981]; Bert V.A. Rbling, Aspects of the Criminal Responsibility for Violations of the
Laws of War, in THE NEW HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 199, 211 (Antonio
Cassese ed., 1979); Sandoz, Penal Aspects, supra note 6, at 225 (rejection of the notion of
"minor war crimes"); STARKE'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 502 (I.A. Shearer ed., 11 th ed. 1994).
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humanity.2' Regardless of criticisms of the Nuremberg and Tokyo
Tribunals,22 the norms of the IMT Charter and both Tribunals' judg-
ments have since 1945 come to represent and be part of general interna-
tional law.23
21. See IMT Charter, supra note 19, art. 6(c), 82 U.N.T.S. at 288. The concept of crimes
against humanity was deemed necessary because war crimes did not cover offenses committed
by a state against its own nationals. See, e.g., G.I.A.D. Draper, War, Laws of Enforcement, in
4 ENCYCLOPEDIA 1981, supra note 20, at 323, 325. In order to show that a crime against
humanity has been committed, it is necessary to demonstrate the systematic or massive nature
of certain acts (and, according to the traditional view, also their official character, i.e., or-
ganization or acquiescence by a state) targeting a certain group on national, political, ethnic,
racial, or religious grounds. See, e.g., Benjamin B. Ferencz, Crimes Against Humanity, in 1
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 869, 870 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1992)
[hereinafter ENCYCLOPEDIA 1992]; 2 GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS
APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 498 (1968) (crimes against humanity
were meant to focus on acts of persecution and extermination of whole groups of civilians);
Secretary-General's Report, supra note 1, para. 48, 32 I.L.M. at 1173. But see Fourth Report
on the Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, [1986] 2(1) Y.B.
Int'l L. Comm'n 55, 56, para. 13, U.N. Doc. AICN.4/SER.A1986/Add.I (Part 1), cited in
LYAL S. SUNGA, INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR SERIOUS HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 136 (1992) (a view that crimes against humanity need not necessarily
involve mass action and that an attack on a single person may constitute such a crime if it has
a specific character which shocks the human conscience; however, such crimes can only be
acts of state and cannot be carried out by private persons).
Due, inter alia, to the debate about whether such crimes were previously recognized by
international law, this category of crimes was substantially played down by the IMT. The
IMT interpreted its Charter to mean that such crimes were punishable only if committed in
connection with crimes against peace or war crimes. This restriction was lifted in the Control
Council Law No. 10 of December 1945 and in subsequent decisions handed down in the
twelve Nuremberg trials conducted under that law. See, e.g., James C. O'Brien, The Interna-
tional Tribunal for Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia,
87 AM. J. INT'L L. 639, 649-50 (1993) (link to other war crimes required only for crimes
against humanity committed before the eruption of an armed conflict); Theodor Meron, War
Crimes in Yugoslavia and the Development of International Law, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 78,
84-87 (1994) (in light of post-Nuremberg developments, especially in the area of human
rights law, crimes against humanity need no longer be linked to war but rather exist indepen-
dently of it).
See generally M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Law and the Holocaust, 9 CAL.
WESTERN INT'L L.J. 201 (1979); M. Cherif Bassiouni, "Crimes Against Humanity": The
Need for a Specialized Convention, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 457 (1994); Egon Schwelb,
Crimes Against Humanity, 23 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 178 (1946).
22. For example, the criticisms that the trials were "victors' justice" (especially since the
Nuremberg and the Tokyo Tribunals did not include any judges from neutral nor vanquished
countries) and that there was retroactive application of penal norms (especially with regard to
crimes against peace and crimes against humanity) and sanctions. For discussion of such
arguments, see, e.g., DONALD A. WELLS, WAR CRIMES AND LAWS OF WAR (2d ed. 1990);
Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity, supra note 21, at 466-72.
23. See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 562 (4th ed.
1990); MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW (3d ed. 1991); SUNGA, supra note 21, at
30-50; Bassiouni, Holocaust, supra note 21, at 235. Yet, subsequent attempts to generalize
the Nuremberg principles have produced meager results. See 2 SCHWARZENBERGER, supra
note 21, at 526-40; Hans-Heinrich Jescheck, Nuremberg Trials, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA 1981,
supra note 20, at 50, 55. Schwarzenberger lists five indications of the impact of the
Nuremberg principles on international law:
(1) The 1946 General Assembly resolutions affirming the principles of the IMT judgment
and the London Charter. But see Jescheck, Nuremberg Trials, supra, at 56.
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The failure of the various Geneva Conventions prior to 1949 to
establish a strong system for repression of breaches of their provisions,
as well as the horrors of World War II and the desire to avoid the
criticisms leveled against the Nuremberg and Tokyo proceedings, led to
the incorporation of a new system of repression in the 1949 Geneva
Conventions - the grave breaches system.
II. SYSTEM OF REPRESSION OF VIOLATIONS UNDER
THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS - OVERVIEW
A. The Contours of the "Grave Breaches" System
The 1949 Geneva Conventions 24 were a result of the horrors of
World War II. The experience of the war substantially affected not only
the scope, substantive content, and procedural safeguards included in the
Conventions but also the system for repression of violations of those
Conventions. It became clear that there was a need for separate, special-
ized provisions for the repression of violations of the existing humani-
tarian conventions.
At the basis of the new system, elaborated in common Articles
49/50/129/146 of the Conventions,25 lies the distinction between "grave
breaches" and all other breaches of the Conventions.26 The Conventions
(2) The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec.
9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951).
(3) Unsuccessful attempts made by the International Law Commission to codify the
Nuremberg principles and to draft a Code on Offences against the Peace and
Security of Mankind under G.A. Res. 177, U.N. GAOR, 2d Sess., 123d plen. mtg.
at 111, 112, UN Doc. A/CN*4/4 (1947). But see Igor P. Blishchenko, Responsibility
in Breaches of International Humanitarian Law, in INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS
OF HUMANITARIAN LAW 283, 285 (United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization ed., 1988). The attempts regarding the Code resurfaced at the
beginning of the 1980s but to date have not resulted in the adoption of such a
code.
(4) Inadequate alterations made in the military laws of the leading powers.
(5) Subsequent practice of parties to armed conflicts and the pervasiveness of war
crimes and grave breaches in post World War II armed conflicts.
See 2 SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 21, at 526-40.
24. See supra note 4.
25. This notation refers to Article 49 of the First Geneva Convention, Article 50 of the
Second Convention, Article 129 of the Third, and Article 146 of the Fourth.
26. Protocol I adds a third category of breach - "'serious' breach." See Protocol I,
supra note 5, art. 90(2)(c)(i), 16 I.L.M. at 1430; see also Third Geneva Convention, supra
note 4, art. 13, 6 U.S.T. at 3328, 75 U.N.T.S. at. 146. However, the distinction between a
"grave" breach and a "serious" violation or breach is not entirely clear. YORAM DINSTEIN,
LAWS OF WAR 275 (1983) (Hebrew); R6ling, supra note 20, at 213.
With respect to nongrave breaches, Articles 49/50/129/146 of the Conventions prescribe
that each High Contracting Party "shall take measures necessary for the suppression" of such
breaches. First Geneva Convention, supra note 4, art. 49, 6 U.S.T. at 3146, 75 U.N.T.S. at 62;
Second Geneva Convention, supra note 4, art. 50, 6 U.S.T. at 3250, 75 U.N.T.S. at 116;
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impose a three part obligation on the High Contracting Parties with
regard to grave breaches. First, there is an obligation to legislate. Each
Party is required to enact any legislation necessary to provide effective
penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed,
any grave breach of the Conventions. Second, each Party is under an
obligation to search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have
ordered the commission of, such grave breaches. Finally, there is an
obligation to try such persons before the national courts, regardless of
their nationality.27 However, each Party enjoys discretion, in accordance
with the provisions of its domestic legislation, to hand such persons
over for trial to another High Contracting Party.28
Thus, the system for repression of grave breaches in the Conven-
tions is based not on international tribunals but on national enforcement
by means of legislation and adjudication before national courts. In order
to facilitate such a system, the principle of universality of jurisdiction
was introduced into the Conventions. According to that principle, a
national court of each of the High Contracting Parties enjoys the juris-
diction to try a person accused of committing, or ordering the commis-
sion of, a grave breach of the Conventions, regardless of the absence of
traditional sources of jurisdiction, such as the nationality of that person
or of the victim, or the place where the offense was committed. The
principle of universality further implies that the enforcement of the
Conventions is not limited to the states that are parties to an armed
conflict. The obligations of repressing grave breaches are imposed on
any High Contracting Party, including a neutral state.29
Several arguments can be put forward in order to explain and sup-
port the grave breaches system. First, there was an apparent need to
Third Geneva Convention, supra note 4, art. 129, 6 U.S.T. at 3418, 75 U.N.T.S. at 239;
Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 4, art. 146, 6 U.S.T. at 3616, 75 U.N.T.S. at 386.
Such measures need not necessarily be legislative, and a Party may well fulfill this obligation
by administrative or disciplinary measures. See G.I.A.D. DRAPER, THE RED CROSS CONVEN-
TIONS 22 (1958).
27. First Geneva Convention, supra note 4, art. 49, 6 U.S.T. at 3146, 75 U.N.T.S. at 62;
Second Geneva Convention, supra note 4, art. 50; 6 U.S.T. at 3250, 75 U.N.T.S. at 116;
Third Geneva Convention, supra note 4, art. 129, 6 U.S.T. at 3418, 75 U.N.T.S. 239; Fourth
Geneva Convention, supra note 4, art. 146, 6 U.S.T. at 3616, 75 U.N.T.S. at 386.
28. This is supposed to be a reflection of the principle, first explicated by Grotius, of aut
dedere aut punire (or, in another version, aut judicare). For criticism of the extradition
provision, see, e.g., DRAPER, RED CROSS CONVENTIONS, supra note 26, at 22 (subjecting the
obligation to extradite an accused person to the provisions of the domestic legislation of a
Party, making that obligation virtually nonexistent). See also Joyce A.C. Gutteridge, The
Geneva Conventions of 1949, 26 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 294, 306 (1949).
29. See 2B FINAL RECORD OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF GENEVA OF 1949 116
(1949) [hereinafter FINAL RECORD].
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foster respect for the Conventions and to ensure their efficient im-
plementation. Grave breaches were given a special place in the Con-
ventions in order to prevent such acts from going unpunished. 30 Second,
the rules provided by the Conventions are meant to contribute to unifor-
mity in the practice of states, thus preventing the resort to ad hoc penal
legislation and adjudication by victorious states of persons belonging to
the vanquished nations.3 ' Third, designating certain acts as "grave
breaches" serves an educational function by drawing special condemna-
tion to acts perceived to be egregious violations of international humani-
tarian law. Finally, the system was intended to ensure a minimum
standard of safeguards to persons accused of committing (or ordering
the commission of) such grave breaches.32
Two preliminary issues ought to be addressed briefly before further
exploration of the concept of "grave breaches." First, does the grave
breaches system invoke individual responsibility? Second, does the
system preclude an international (as opposed to a national) tribunal?
An argument may be put forward that the Conventions do not
impose any direct international obligations on individuals but are con-
fined to the imposition of duties upon states (for instance, to legislate
and prosecute). However, such an argument is clearly refuted by the
principles enunciated in the IMT Charter and in the Nuremberg Judg-
ment.33 Indeed, although the drafters of the Conventions have avoided
using the term "war crimes" with regard to acts defined as "grave
breaches," 34 it seems overwhelmingly accepted that those acts do, in
fact, constitute war crimes and involve individual responsibility for
breaches of the laws of war.35 It may thus be contended that the national
30. Id. at 85, 114, 356.
31. Id. at 115. See also G.I.A.D. Draper, The Geneva Conventions of 1949, 114
R.C.A.D.I. 63, 156 (1965-I); Sandoz, Penal Aspects, supra note 6, at 225.
32. Guarantees of fair trial are assured such persons. The last paragraph of Articles
49/50/129/146 of the Geneva Conventions provides that, "In all circumstances, the accused
persons shall benefit by safeguards of proper trial and defence, which shall not be less
favourable than those provided by Article 105 and those following of the Geneva Convention
relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949." First Geneva Convention,
supra note 4, art. 49, 6 U.S.T. at 3146, 75 U.N.T.S. at 62; Second Geneva Convention, supra
note 4, art. 50, 6 U.S.T. at 3250, 75 U.N.T.S. at 116; Third Geneva Convention, supra note 4,
art. 129, 6 U.S.T. at 3418, 75 U.N.T.S. at 239; Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 4, art.
146, 6 U.S.T. at 3616, 75 U.N.T.S. at 386.
33. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text; see also Edward M. Wise, Interna-
tional Crimes and Domestic Criminal Law, 38 DEPAUL L. REV. 923, 932-35.
34. See infra note 45 and accompanying text.
35. See, e.g., BROWNLIE, supra note 23, at 563; DINSTEIN, LAWS OF WAR, supra note
26, at 277; Gutteridge, supra note 28, at 305; Dietrich Oehler, Criminal Law, in 1 ENCYCLO-
PEDIA 1992, supra note 21, at 877, 881; G.I.A.D. Draper, The Implementation and Enforce-
ment of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols of 1978 (sic), 164
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courts are to be regarded as organs of the international community in
this context.
36
Second, it may be argued that the Conventions preclude resort to an
international tribunal for adjudication of alleged grave breaches by
vesting exclusive jurisdiction in the national courts of the High Con-
tracting Parties. 7 Thus, the argument goes, the system introduced in the
Conventions has created a jurisdictional difference between grave
breaches and other war crimes - whereas grave breaches will be sub-
ject to the exclusive jurisdiction of national courts under the principle of
universality, other war crimes can be brought before an international
tribunal.3" However, the better view seems to be that, while the Conven-
tions contemplate trial by national courts, they do not preclude trials
before an international tribunal.39 The establishment of the International
Tribunal by a Security Council resolution as a measure under Chapter
VII of the U.N. Charter bypasses such concerns. The International
Tribunal's source of subject matter jurisdiction is therefore not to be
found in the Conventions as such, although its Statute practically incor-
porates the Conventions by way of reference'
R.C.A.D.I. 1, 38 (1979-11); VON GLAHN, supra note 14, at 871-72. Article 85(5) of Protocol
I explicitly recognizes grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and the Protocol itself as
constituting war crimes. Protocol I, supra note 5, art. 85(5), 16 I.L.M. at 1427.
36. See, e.g., Yoram Dinstein, International Criminal Law, 20 ISR. L. REV. 206, 227-28
(1985).
37. See Draper, Implementation and Enforcement, supra note 35, at 38; Draper, The
Geneva Conventions, supra note 31, at 158. A draft clause proposed by the International
Committee of the Red Cross, intending to provide the possibility of an international jurisdic-
tion as an alternative to trial by national courts of persons accused of committing grave
breaches of the Conventions, was rejected by the Diplomatic Conference. See infra note 43; 2
SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 21, at 542-43 (such a move reflected the antipathy to
international war crimes trials).
38. See Draper, The Geneva Conventions, supra note 31, at 158.
39. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Repression of Breaches of the Geneva Conventions Under
the Draft Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, 8 RUTGERS
CAMDEN L.J. 185, 196 (1977) (although grave breaches are punishable by national courts,
they have also been deemed international crimes and thus are punishable by any competent
international tribunal; in addition, each of the High Contracting Parties may confer jurisdiction
upon such an international tribunal); Theodor Meron, The Case for War Crimes Trials in
Yugoslavia, 72 FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Summer 1993, at 122, 129.
40. See Statute of the International Tribunal, supra note 1, art. 2, 32 I.L.M. at 1192. It
may be further noted that in any case the obligations incurred by Member States under the
U.N. Charter prevail over other international obligations imposed on them. See U.N. CHARTER
art. 103; Payarn Akhavan, Punishing War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia: A Critical
Juncture for the New World Order, 15 HuM. RTS. Q. 262, 277-79.
The principle of universal jurisdiction is also maintained by means of Articles 9 and 10
of the Statute of the International Tribunal. See Statute of the International Tribunal, supra
note 1, arts. 9-10, 32 I.L.M. at 1194-95. As was stated by the U.N. Secretary-General,
"[i]ndeed national courts should be encouraged to exercise their jurisdiction in accordance
with their relevant national laws and procedures." Secretary-General's Report, supra note 1,
para. 64, 32 I.L.M. at 1176.
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B. The Development of the Concept of "Grave Breaches"41
In December 1948, the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) prepared a draft of four new articles dealing with repression and
suppression of breaches of the draft Conventions. In these draft articles
it was suggested for the first time that the Conventions themselves
incorporate the concept and definition of "grave breaches." 42 According
to the proposed draft, each High Contracting Party was obligated to
enact provisions for the repression of any breach of the Conventions and
to ensure the prosecution of any act contrary to their provisions. The
draft instructed the High Contracting Parties' domestic tribunals, or "any
international jurisdiction the competence of which has been recognized
by [the High Contracting Parties]," to punish grave breaches as crimes
43against the law of nations.
Although there are several differences between the draft articles put
forward in December 1948 and the final text of the articles as incor-
porated in the Conventions, the two basic principles of uniformity of
practice and punishment were left intact. The Conventions incorporated
a system of universal jurisdiction in order to facilitate uniform treatment
41. For a more detailed description, see IV GENEVA CONVENTIONS COMMENTARY, supra
note 6, at 584-89; 2B FINAL RECORD, supra note 29, at 114-18.
42. A previous draft article presented by the International Committee to the Seventeenth
International Red Cross Conference in 1948 stated as follows:
The Contracting Parties shall be under the obligation to search for persons charged
with breaches of the present Convention, whatever their nationality. They shall
further, in accordance with their national legislation or with the Conventions for the
repression of acts considered as war crimes, refer them for trial to their own courts,
or hand them over for judgment to another Contracting Party.
IV GENEVA CONVENTIONS COMMENTARY, supra note 6, at 585.
43. The proposed draft article, entitled "Grave Violations" provided as follows:
Without prejudice to the provisions of the foregoing Article [dealing with legislative
measures to repress any violation of the Conventions], grave breaches of the
Convention shall be punished as crimes against the law of nations by the tribunals
of any of the High Contracting Parties or by any international jurisdiction the
competence of which has been recognized by them. Grave breaches shall include in
particular those which cause death, great human suffering or serious injury to body
or health, those which constitute a grave denial of personal liberty or a derogation
from the dignity due to the person or involve extensive destruction of property, also
breaches which by reason of their nature or persistence show a deliberate disregard
of this Convention.
Each High Contracting Party shall in conformity with the foregoing Article enact
suitable provisions for the extradition of any person accused of a grave breach of this
Convention, whom the said High Contracting Party does not bring before its own
tribunals.
IV id. at 586.
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in the repression of grave breaches while sending an advance warning to
potential offenders.' Indeed, it was because of this notion of uniformity
of treatment that the drafters preferred the term grave "breaches" to the
suggested terms of "grave crimes" and "war crimes" - the idea being
that the concept of "crime" had different meanings in different legal
systems and cultures.45
Evaluation of the implementation of the system of grave breaches
since its inception in 1949 leads to mixed conclusions. The High Con-
tracting Parties have yet to exercise universal jurisdiction over grave
breaches. 46 Moreover, although of an absolute character,47 the majority of
states have not fulfilled their obligation under common Articles
49/50/129/146 to enact proper legislation.48 Interestingly enough, the
former Yugoslavia was one of the first states to fulfill this obligation by
44. See Iid. at 370-71.
45. Use of the terms "grave crimes" or "war crimes" had been suggested by the U.S.S.R.
delegation. The term "breaches" was preferred, although it was clear that most acts defined as
"grave breaches," if not all of them, had already been defined as crimes under the various
domestic penal laws of the High Contracting Parties. 2B FINAL RECORD, supra note 29, at 31,
33, 85-87, 115-16, 355-60, 363; see also I GENEVA CONVENTIONS COMMENTARY, supra
note 6, at 371; Draper, The Geneva Conventions, supra note 31, at 155.
A related argument leveled against using the term "war crimes" in this context was that
an act is considered a crime only when made punishable under the relevant domestic legisla-
tion. Since the Conventions are not a penal code, a violation of their provisions could not
directly be made into a crime. 2B FINAL RECORD, supra note 29, at 86, 116, 357; see also
Waldemar A. Solf & Edward R. Cummings, A Survey of Penal Sanctions Under Protocol I to
the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, 9 CASE WESTERN RES. J. INT'L L. 205, 239
(1977). But see Richard R. Baxter, The Municipal and International Law Basis of Jurisdiction
over War Crimes, 28 BRaIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 382 (1951) (international law is directly applicable
to war criminals; no need for implementing legislation in order to make grave breach a
crime).
Another objection to the use of the term "war crimes" was based on the ground that it
would be premature to attempt a definition of a certain category of war crimes or include any
provisions for the repression and punishment of war crimes as such. This objection pointed to
the (at the time) anticipated codification of the Nuremberg principles by the International Law
Commission. Thus, the draft articles prepared by the ICRC, see supra notes 42-43, which
implicitly codified the legal principles of the Nuremberg Judgment, were replaced by the
grave breaches system. 2B FINAL RECORD, supra note 29, at 117; see also Gutteridge, supra
note 28, at 304-05; Raymund T. Yingling & Robert W. Ginnane, The Geneva Conventions of
1949, 46 AM. J. INT'L L. 393, 424-25 (1952).
46. See infra note 52.
47. See 2 SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 21, at 542 (such obligations are absolute and
of a jus cogens character). The absolute character of the states' obligations is also reflected in
common Articles 51/52/131/148 of the Conventions, providing that the obligations imposed on
states with regard to grave breaches cannot be waived or in any way affected by means of an
agreement among the belligerents. Thus, there is no effect to an agreement by which a defeated
state has been compelled to abandon all claims due for violations of the Conventions committed
by persons in the service of the victorious state. IV GENEVA CONVENTIONS COMMENTARY, supra
note 6, at 602-03; see also Yves Sandoz, Implementing International Humanitarian Law, in
INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 23, at 259, 275 (1988).
48. See, e.g., Blishchenko, supra note 23, at 288; FRiTS KALSHOVEN, CONSTRAINTS ON THE
WAGING OF WAR 69 (1987).
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modifying its Penal Code to conform to the provisions of the Conven-
tions.'9
III. "GRAVE BREACHES" OF THE CONVENTIONS - THE
SUBSTANTIVE CONTENT 0
Analysis of the substantive content of the grave breaches enumerated
in the Conventions is no easy task. Not only are the language and terms
used vague at times, but the mechanism for repression of grave breaches
established in 1949 has never been applied. No international penal tribunal
was established until the International Tribunal in 1993, 5' and the High
Contracting Parties have never used the universal jurisdiction granted them
under the Conventions.52
Apart from an examination of the Conventions themselves, the follow-
ing analysis of the content of "grave breaches" seeks to incorporate
references to other international documents (global as well as regional)
and to the experience of domestic jurisdictions. This mode of analysis
derives its strength from the growing trend towards greater convergence
and intersection of the norms and rules of international humanitarian law
and of those pertaining to human rights law. 3
49. See IV GENEVA CONVENTIONS COMMENTARY, supra note 6, at 590 n.1, 594. In fact,
according to the Commentary, the Yugoslav Penal Code went further in its prohibition of war
crimes than the list of grave breaches included in the Conventions. Id.
Indeed, the 1976 Criminal Code of the Republic of Yugoslavia (as amended) includes a
separate Heading (Number 16), entitled "Criminal Acts Against Humanity and International
Law." The articles appearing under this heading encompass such crimes as Genocide,
Instigation of an Aggressive War, and Destruction of Cultural and Historical Monuments. Of
special significance is Article 142, dealing with "War Crimes Against Civilian Population." I
thank Jennifer Green for supplying me with a translated copy of the relevant parts of the
Criminal Code.
The Criminal Code of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, adopted in 1993, retains
Chapter 16 virtually intact. The Croatian Criminal Code of 1991 included the provisions
dealing with crimes against humanity in Chapter 15, but did not change their substantive
content. Bosnia-Herzegovina retains the prohibitions included in the Criminal Code of the
Former Yugoslavia. See Jennefier Green et al., Affecting the Rules for the Prosecution of
Rape and Other Gender-Based Violence Before the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia: A Feminist Proposal and Critique, 5 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. (Summer
1994) (forthcoming 1995).
50. The following analysis of the specific acts constituting grave breaches of the
Conventions does not purport to cover fully the complex range of issues which arise with
regard to concepts such as "torture," "inhuman treatment," "destruction of property," and
"deportations." Rather, it is meant to give a synopsis of the major issues connected with each
of the above mentioned terms and concepts.
51. See, e.g., Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 14 (1994).
52. See Sandoz, Penal Aspects, supra note 6, at 230; Draper, Implementation and
Enforcement, supra note 35, at 39. The Eichmann trial - Attorney-General v. Eichmann, 36
I.L.R. 5 (Jerusalem Dist. Ct., 1961), 36 I.L.R. 277 (Sup. Ct. 1962) - is the exception (proving
the rule).
53. See, e.g., STARKE'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 20, at 500-01 (trend of importing
human rights rules and standards into the law of armed conflicts); Dietrich Schindler, Human
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The lists of "grave breaches" found in common Articles 50/51/130/147
of the Conventions are comprised of nine categories of violations. 4 The
lists are not identical. In fact, only three grave breaches are mentioned in
all four Conventions; they are noted in italics in the list below. The nine
categories of acts constituting grave breaches of the Conventions are as
follows:
(1) Wilful killing (First, Second, Third, and Fourth Conven-
tions);
(2) Torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experi-
ments (First, Second, Third, and Fourth Conventions);
(3) Wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or
health (First, Second, Third, and Fourth Conventions);
(4) Extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not jus-
tified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and
wantonly (First, Second, and Fourth Conventions);
(5) Compelling a Prisoner of War or a protected person to serve
in the forces of the hostile Power (Third and Fourth Conven-
tions);
(6) Wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or a protected person
of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in the
Convention (Third and Fourth Conventions);
(7) Unlawful deportation or transfer of a protected person
(Fourth Convention);
(8) Unlawful confinement of a protected person (Fourth Con-
vention); and
(9) Taking of hostages (Fourth Convention).
In order to be considered a grave breach, each of the acts listed above
must be committed against persons or property protected by the relevant
Rights and Humanitarian Law: Interrelationship of the Laws, 31 AM. U. L. REV. 935 (1982);
Asbjorn Eide, The Laws of War and Human Rights - Differences and Convergences, in
STUDIES AND ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND RED CROSS PRINCIPLES
675 (Christophe Swinarski ed., 1984); A.H. Robertson, Humanitarian Law and Human Rights,
in STUDIES AND ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND RED CROSS PRINCIPLES,
supra, at 793. Indeed, it may be argued that the system of grave breaches in the Conventions
is, in and of itself, a reflection of the growing intersection between the two fields of law,
contributing to the blurring of any sharp distinctions between the two. See SUNGA, supra note
21, at 53-54.
54. First Geneva Convention, supra note 4, art. 50, 6 U.S.T. at 3146, 75 U.N.T.S. at 62;
Second Geneva Convention, supra note 4, art. 51, 6 U.S.T. at 3250, 75 U.N.T.S. at 116; Third
Geneva Convention, supra note 4, art. 130, 6 U.S.T. at 3420, 75 U.N.T.S. at 238; Fourth Geneva
Convention, supra note 4, art. 147, 6 U.S.T. at 3618, 75 U.N.T.S. at 388.
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Convention.55 One of the impacts of this qualification is that no grave
breach can be committed by a state and its agents against the nationals
of that state.
Several issues are left unresolved by the Conventions. Thus, it might
be argued that the level of criminal intent, mens rea, needed to establish
criminal responsibility is not clear. The term "wilful" appearing as the
mental element required for some of the grave breaches mentioned above,
may literally signify no more than the voluntary commission of a criminal
act. On the other hand, it covers conscious and intentional acts.56 In
addition, issues pertaining to the range, scope, and content of permissible
defenses which may be invoked by an accused person, the penal respon-
sibility for omission to act57 or for participation (other than committing
55. The term "protected persons" is defined in Article 13 of the First Geneva Convention,
Article 13 of the Second Convention, Article 4 of the Third Convention, and Article 4 of the
Fourth Convention. First Geneva Convention, supra note 4, art. 13, 6 U.S.T. at 3124, 75
U.N.T.S. at 40; Second Geneva Convention, supra note 4, art. 13, 6 U.S.T. at 3228, 75 U.N.T.S.
at 94; Third Geneva Convention, supra note 4, art. 4, 6 U.S.T. at 3320, 75 U.N.T.S. at 138;
Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 4, art. 4, 6 U.S.T. at 3520, 75 U.N.T.S. at 290. The
"protected property" is to be deduced from various articles incorporated in each of the
Conventions. See infra part III.D.
56. However, in the Commentary on the Additional Protocols, the term "wilfully" refers
to acts committed consciously and with intent, i.e., the perpetrator's mind is on the act and its
consequences, and he or she wills those consequences to occur. See INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE
OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS 994 (Yves Sandoz et al.
eds., 1987). Thus, while recklessness is covered by that term, negligence or lack of foresight
is not.
See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1599 (6th ed. 1990) for a definition of "willful":
An act or omission is "willfully" done, if done voluntarily and intentionally and with
the specific intent to do something the law forbids, or with the specific intent to fail
to do something the law requires to be done; that is to say, with bad purpose either
to disobey or to disregard the law. It is a word of many meanings, with its construc-
tion often influenced by its context. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101
(additional citations omitted).
A willful act may be described as one done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely,
without justifiable excuse, as distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly,
heedlessly, or inadvertently. A willful act differs essentially from a negligent act. The
one is positive and the other negative.
57. Under Articles 49/50/129/146 of the Geneva Conventions, penal sanctions are to be
imposed (in national legislation) on persons committing or ordering to be committed a grave
breach of the Conventions. First Geneva Convention, supra note 4, art. 49, 6 U.S.T. at 3146,
75 U.N.T.S. at 62; Second Geneva Convention, supra note 4, art. 50, 6 U.S.T. at 3250, 75
U.N.T.S. at 116; Third Geneva Convention, supra note 4, art. 129, 6 U.S.T. at 3418, 75
U.N.T.S. at 239; Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 4, art. 146, 6 U.S.T. at 3616, 75
U.N.T.S. at 386. Thus, issues such as the responsibility for failure to act to prevent or put an
end to a grave breach when a person had a duty to act was left for the discretion of the different
states. Under Protocol I, however, responsibility for ."negative criminality," i.e., failure to act,
is explicitly recognized in Article 86. See Oling, supra note 20, at 208, 211, 213-14 (Protocol
I merely codifies the rules applied by the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals concerning the
responsibility for omission to prevent war crimes).
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or ordering the commission of a grave breach),58 and the proper penalties
to be imposed on persons duly convicted of violations of the Conven-
tions, 59 are left open. Finally, the question of proper canons of interpreta-
tion may carry special weight in the context of adjudication under penal
provisions included in an international convention. In other words, are the
general rules of treaty interpretation applicable to the Conventions, or
should courts (whether national or international) refer to special rules
which may pertain to the construction of penal norms?
A. Wilful Killing
According to the Commentary on the Conventions, the term "wilful
killing" refers, broadly speaking, to cases where protected persons are put
to death without any resistance on their part.' It covers cases where death
occurred through an omission" provided that "the omission must have
been wilful and there must have been an intention to cause death by it."62
The Commentary emphasizes that a requirement for an "intention to cause
death" exists and that mere negligence or cases of actual physical impos-
sibility are not covered under the category of "wilful killing."63
Some of the examples mentioned in the Commentary as constituting
wilful killing are: (1) execution of hostages; (2) putting protected persons
to death as a reprisal; (3) giving instructions to decrease the food rations
of prisoners of war or civilian internees to a point that deficiency diseases
causing death occur; (4) in the Commentary for the First and Second
Conventions, attempts on the life of medical personnel or chaplains are
58. The Genocide Convention imposes criminal responsibility for conspiracy, attempt,
complicity, and incitement to commit the crime of genocide. See Genocide Convention, supra
note 23, 78 U.N.T.S. at 277. However, the Conventions (and the Additional Protocols) limit
the imposition of criminal responsibility to those who committed or ordered the commission
of a grave breach.
Article 7(1) of the Statute of the International Tribunal provides that, "A person who
planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning,
preparation or execution of a crime referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute, shall be
individually responsible for the crime." Statute of the International Tribunal, supra note 1, art.
7(1), 32 I.L.M. at 1194; see also id. art. 2, 32 I.L.M. at 1192 (targeting those who "committed
or ordered to be committed"); 2B FINAL RECORD, supra note 29, at 115; Dinstein, International
Criminal Law, supra note 36, at 231 (the general principles of international criminal law have
not evolved to a stage where every act of attempt, complicity, conspiracy, and incitement to
commit an offense is, by itself, such an offense).
59. See discussion infra part V.
60. See I GENEVA CONVENTIONS COMMENTARY, supra note 6, at 371.
61. See IV id. at 597.
62. Id. From the cumulative language used here it seems apparent that "wilfulness" is not
to be equated with the existence of an intention to cause death.
63. See I i, at 371.
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also mentioned.6 Finally, the Commentary leaves open the question
whether the death of a prisoner of war or a civilian internee as a result
of an act of war may be considered "wilful killing. 65
B. Torture or Inhuman Treatment Including Biological Experiments
1. Torture
The Commentary on the First Geneva Convention devotes only a few
lines to the grave breach of "torture or inhuman treatment," explaining that
the terms "torture," "inhuman treatment," and "biological experiments"
are clear enough and need no detailed comment. 66 However, the Com-
mentary on the Fourth Convention devotes more space to this issue. The
position adopted by the Commentary suggests that, although the term
"torture" may have a range of permissible meanings, it must be viewed
in the context of the other expressions which follow, such as "inhuman
treatment" and "suffering." Such contextual examination leads to the
conclusion that "torture" must be given its "legal meaning" - the
infliction of suffering on a person to obtain from that person, or from
another, confessions or information.67 Thus, the crucial issue is not the
pain inflicted on a person but the purpose behind its infliction. In the
absence of the required purpose, assault on the physical or moral integrity
of a person is not considered to be "torture. '' 8
a. Prohibition Against Torture Under International
Instruments and Custom
Since 1949, a substantial body of international instruments, court
judgments, and scholarly writings have developed around the prohibition
of torture, which forms part of human rights law. These sources can
enhance and enrich our understanding of the concept and scope of the
parallel prohibition found in international humanitarian law.69 Thus, it is
to these sources that this article now turns.
64. See I id at 371; II id. at 267; III id. at 626-27; IV id. at 597.
65. See Ill id. at 627; IV id. at 597. One example given is that of bombardment of a
civilian hospital.
66. See I id at 372.
67. See IV id. at 598. This "legal meaning" has since been expanded to include other
purposes for the infliction of suffering on a person. See discussion infra part III.B.I.b.
68. IV GENEVA CONVENTIONS COMMENTARY, supra note 6, at 598. Although, of course,
such an assault may fall into other categories of acts constituting grave breaches of the
Conventions, e.g., inhuman treatment or wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body
or health. See infra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
69. See supra note 53.
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The prohibition against torture is entrenched in numerous international
instruments. 70 Moreover, those international instruments recognize that the
right not to be subjected to torture is nonderogable - it cannot be
compromised, limited, derogated from, or completely abandoned, even in
the face of real emergency.7' In addition, it seems that the prohibition
against torture forms part of international customary law.72
b. What Constitutes "Torture"?
Only two of the international instruments mentioned above define the
term "torture. ' 73 Other international instruments usually state, in a general
70. For international human rights instruments which prohibit torture, see, e.g., A Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, art. 5, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. for Sept.
21-Dec. 12, 1948, at 71, 73; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966,
art. 7, S. TREATY Doc. No. 2, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 175; European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art.
3, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 224; American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 5(2),
O.E.A. T.S. No. 36, at 2, 9 I.L.M. 673, 676; African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights,
art. 5, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev.5, 21 I.L.M. 59, 60.
For international instruments focusing on the prohibition of torture, see, e.g., the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
Dec. 10, 1984, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. 51, at 197 [hereinafter Convention Against
Torture]; Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 3452, U.N. GAOR,
30th Sess., Supp. No. 34, at 91 (1975), 23 I.L.M. 1027 [hereinafter 1975 Declaration].
71. See Convention Against Torture, supra note 70, 77, art. 2(2), U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess.,
Supp. 51, at 197, 23 I.L.M. at 1028; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra
note 70, art. 4, 999 U.N.T.S. at 174; European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 70,
art. 15(1), 213 U.N.T.S. at 232; American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 70, art.
27, O.E.A. T.S. No. 36, at 9, 9 I.L.M. at 678.
72. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 702 (1987). As to the practice of states, see Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d
Cir. 1980) (freedom from torture forming part of the law of nations); M. Cherif Bassiouni &
Daniel Derby, The Crime of Torture, in 1 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 6, at 363,
382; Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Report by
Special Rapporteur, Mr. P Kooijmans, U.N. ESCOR, 42d Sess., paras. 69-74, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1986/15 (1986) [hereinafter Kooijmans Report]; J. HERMAN BURGERS & HANS
DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE: A HANDBOOK ON THE
CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT
OR PUNISHMENT 12 (1988). While there is no argument that torture of nationals of hostile states
is prohibited under customary international law, some authors claim that "[tihe matter of
protection of nationals from their own government, even in time of war, remains unclear."
Bassiouni & Derby, supra, at 379.
73. Article 1 of the 1975 Declaration defines "torture" as follows:
1. For the purpose of this Declaration, torture means any act by which severe
pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted by
or at the instigation of a public official on a person for such purposes as
obtaining from him or a third person information or confession, punishing
him for an act he has committed or is suspected of having committed, or
intimidating him or other persons. It does not include pain or suffering
arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions to the




language, that "[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or inhuman treat-
ment" without supplying a definition for these terms.
Even if, at first blush, it may seem that the concept of torture is "clear
enough and needs no detailed comment,"74 that perceived clarity is blurred
when "torture" is put side by side with concepts such as "inhuman" or
"degrading" treatment. In fact, the terms "torture" and "inhuman treat-
ment" are not wholly separable, the former forming a part of the latter.7"
Thus, the difference between an act of inhuman treatment and an act
amounting (or better still, descending) to the level of torture is not one
of kind, but rather of degree - both may be seen as occupying different
points on the same spectrum. Torture may be regarded as an aggravated
form of "inhuman treatment., 76 Consequently, the distinction between
torture and inhuman treatment may be drawn along one of two lines,77
namely, the distinction may be one of severity or one of specific purpose.
Two of the prominent commentators on the Convention Against
Torture71 offer some guidelines to understanding the nature of "torture"
as described in that Convention. 79 First, in order to constitute torture, an
2. Torture constitutes an aggravated and deliberate form of cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment.
1975 Declaration, supra note 70, art. 1, U.N. GAOR 30th Sess., Supp. No. 34, at 91.
Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture provides as follows:
1. For the purposes of this Convention, the term "torture" means any act by
which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally
inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third
person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third
person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating
or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimina-
tion of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or
other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or
suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.
2. This article is without prejudice to any international instrument or national
legislation which does or may contain provisions of wider application.
Convention Against Torture, supra note 70, 77, art. 1, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. 51, at
197, 23 I.L.M. at 1027.
For a discussion of the negotiating history of the definition of "torture" in the Convention,
see BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 72, at 41-47.
74. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
75. See, e.g., J.E.S. FAWCETT, THE APPLICATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 43 (2d ed. 1987); Rolf Kiihner, Torture, in 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA 1981, supra note
20, at 510, 510.
76. See 1975 Declaration, supra note 70, art. 1(2), U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., Supp. No. 34,
at 91; see also infra note 86.
77. Those two lines are by no means mutually exclusive and may be considered together.
78. See supra note 70.
79. BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 72, at 117-23. The commentators remark that the
Convention does not define "torture" but rather describes it.
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act must cause severe pain. That pain need not be inflicted systematically,
and even an isolated act may be considered torture. Second, an omission
may, in certain cases, be considered as similar to an act. 0 Third, torture
must be intentional; mere negligence would not be sufficient. Fourth, the
list of purposes for which severe pain or suffering is intentionally inflicted
is not exhaustive. Rather, it includes the most common purposes. Other
purposes, of similar type (but not any other purpose), may be recognized."'
Fifth, the primary objective of the Convention Against Torture is to
eliminate torture committed by or under the responsibility of public
officials for purposes connected with their public functions.8 2 Indeed, the
Convention Against Torture is directed only at acts of torture for which
the authorities could be held responsible; it does not cover criminal acts
by private individuals.8 3
Case law regarding use of torture and resort to inhuman treatment is
most developed under the regime of the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 4 In the Greek
Case,5 the European Commission of Human Rights stated that "[t]he word
'torture' is often used to describe inhuman treatment, which has a purpose,
such as the obtaining of information or confessions, or the infliction of
punishment, and it is generally an aggravated form of inhuman treatment.
8 6
80. For example, intentional failure to provide a prisoner with food or drink.
81. The common element of those purposes is understood to be the existence of some, even
remote, connection with the interests or the policies of the state and its organs. See BURGERS
& DANELIUS, supra note 72, at 119. In any event, the purpose of extracting information from
a person is not a necessary condition for an act to be considered torture.
82. However, Burgers and Danelius suggest that only in exceptional cases may it be
possible to conclude that the infliction of severe pain or suffering by a public official did not
constitute torture on the ground that he or she acted for purely private reasons. Id. Prison
officials and employees, law enforcement personnel, members of the military, as well as
members of paramilitary forces acting with actual or implied support of government officials,
may be considered as "public officials." See Deborah Blatt, Recognizing Rape as a Method of
Torture, 19 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 821, 863 (1992).
It is important to note, in this context, that torture and inhuman treatment are not confined
to prisons nor to persons held in detention. Thus, for example, many acts of rape have been
committed, according to reports, in the rape victim's own home. See, e.g., Letter Dated May
24, 1994 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, Annex (Final
Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780),
paras. 241-42, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (1994) [hereinafter Report of the Commission of Experts].
83. The assuinption is that acts which the state does not condone or to which the state does
not acquiesce would be prosecuted in due course through the domestic penal system of that state.
84. For a comprehensive review of that case law, see Love Kellberg, The Case-Law of the
European Commission of Human Rights on Art. 3 of the ECHR, in THE INTERNATIONAL FIGHT
AGAINST TORTURE 97 (Antonio Cassese ed., 1991); Nicolas Valticos, La jurisprudence de la
Cour europenne des droits de l'homme sur l'art. 3 de la Convention europienne des droits
de l'homme, in THE INTERNATIONAL FIGHT AGAINST TORTURE, supra, at 121.
85. [1969 Greek Case] Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.) (Report).
86. Id. at 186, ch. IV, para. 2. Some of the methods involved in this case were: intimidation
(by means of mock executions and death threats) and humiliation (by use of insulting language
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In the case of Ireland v. United Kingdom,7 the European Commission
of Human Rights unanimously found that the combined use of the "five
techniques" constituted a practice of torture and inhuman treatment. 8  The
European Court saw the distinction between the two categories as deriving
from "a difference in the intensity of the suffering inflicted."' 9 The concept
of "torture" was meant to "attach a special stigma to deliberate inhuman
treatment causing very serious and cruel suffering."' Thus, while recog-
nizing that the five techniques constituted inhuman treatment, the Court
ruled that they were not "torture."9' In no other case brought before the
European Commission or the European Court has either organ determined
that the acts in question constituted prohibited "torture" under Article 3
of the European Convention.
Finally, in an affidavit submitted recently to the United States District
Court for the District of Massachusetts by twenty-seven international law
scholars, a list of acts constituting torture was offered. According to the
authors of the affidavit, this list reflects a consensus among international
law publicists. The acts included in the list are as follows:
92
(1) Rape, sexual abuse, and other forms of gender-based vio-
lence;
and stripping detainees naked) of prisoners; threats of reprisals against relatives of prisoners;
coercing to witness the torture of others; prolonged isolation;falanga and bastinado, electrical
shocks, and beatings directed at the genitals; exposure to loud noise; pulling out of nails; and
severe detention conditions.
87. [1976] YB. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 512 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.), 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) at 1 (1978).
88. The five techniques were techniques of interrogation which had been used against
detainees in Northern Ireland. Those techniques included wall-standing, hooding, subjection to
noise, deprivation of sleep, and deprivation of food and drink. Ireland, [1976] Y.B. Eur. Conv.
on H.R. at 788-94.
89. Ireland, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 66-67, paras. 167-68.
90. Id.
91. Id. For criticism of this mode of distinction between torture and inhuman treatment,
see FAWCE'r, supra note 75, at 45-46 (inhuman treatment is itself an extreme, and it is difficult
to see how it can be further aggravated). This case may also give rise to an argument which
emphasizes a holistic approach when determining the occurrence of "torture," i.e., in certain
circumstances, a series of acts, which by themselves might not amount to torture, may be
considered as such when examined and evaluated as pieces of a broader picture, rather than
considered as distinct and separate from each other. Such an approach may be discerned in the
Commission's Report in Ireland v. United Kingdom, where each of the five techniques was not
considered, standing alone, to constitute torture, although a combination of elements in the use
of those techniques transferred them to the level of torture. A somewhat related notion is that
of "administrative practice" (i.e., repetition of acts of ill-treatment and official tolerance of them)
as explained in the Greek Case by the European Commission.
92. See Ortiz v. Gramajo, Civil Action No. 91-11612 (Mass. Dist. Ct.), Affidavit of
International Law Scholars [hereinafter Affidavit] (on file with author). The list is not meant
to be exhaustive.
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(2) Sustained, systematic beating (particularly if performed with
certain instruments or when the victim is bound or otherwise
forced into a position that will increase the pain of the
beating; the same would apply to beating directed at certain
parts of the body, e.g., genitals or the soles of the feet);
(3) Electric shocks, infliction of bums, and exposure to extreme
heat or cold;
(4) Binding or otherwise forcing the victim into positions that
cause pain;
(5) Denying food, water, or medical attention when that.denial
will cause the victim to suffer, or to continue to suffer,
severe physical or mental pain and suffering.
2. Inhuman treatment
a. The 1949 Geneva Conventions
While few international instruments have attempted to define or even
to describe "torture," the concept of "inhuman treatment" has not even
gotten that far.93 The Conventions supply the most detailed guidelines to
understanding what acts constitute "inhuman treatment." The Commentary
on the Conventions ties the expression "inhuman treatment" to Articles
12/12/13/27 of the Conventions, which relate to the humane treatment to
be accorded to protected persons.94 Thus, it is submitted that any act in
contravention of the rules enumerated in those articles amounts to
93. Indeed, as the Geneva Conventions Commentary recognizes, "tt]his idea is rather
difficult to define." IV GENEVA CONVENTIONS COMMENTARY, supra note 6, at 598. See
BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 72, at 70-71, 122.
94. For example, Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention provides that:
Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their persons, their
honour, their family rights, their religious convictions and practices, and their manners
and customs. They shall at all times be humanely treated, and shall be protected espe-
cially against all acts of violence or threats thereof and against insults and public
curiosity.
Women shall be especially protected against any attack on their honour, in particular
against rape, enforced prostitution, or any. form of indecent assault.
Without prejudice to the provisions relating to their state of health, age and sex, all
protected persons shall be treated with the same consideration by the Party to the
conflict in whose power they are, without any adverse distinction based, in particular,
on race, religion or political opinion.
However, the Parties to the conflict may take such measures of control and security
in regard to protected persons as may be necessary as a result of the war.
Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 4, art. 27, 6 U.S.T. at 3536, 75 U.N.T.S. at 306.
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prohibited "inhuman treatment."95 The intention of that prohibition is to
grant protection for protected persons by preserving their human dignity
and preventing them from "being brought down to the level of animals. 96
Thus, for an act to be considered "inhuman treatment," it is not necessary
for there to be a physical attack on a protected person; an attack against
his or her human dignity may, in certain circumstances, be sufficient.
97
The term "inhuman treatment" does not lend itself to a comprehensive,
exhaustive listing of what constitutes such treatment. Rather, for the
purposes of the Conventions, this concept should be given specific content
in each particular case in light of the general principles laid down in
Article 27 of the Fourth Convention (and the equivalent articles in the
other Conventions) and the examples given in that article of acts con-
stituting inhuman treatment of protected persons.
98
b. Outside the Geneva law
In international instruments and under customary international law,
the prohibition against inhuman treatment enjoys a status similar to the
prohibition against torture.9 Indeed, the two always appear together in the
various relevant international instruments.
The European Commission of Human Rights described the concept
of "inhuman treatment" as including within its scope "at least such
treatment as deliberately causes severe suffering, mental or physical,
which, in the particular situation, is unjustifiable."'" The European Court
95. See H1 GENEVA CONVENTIONS COMMENTARY, supra note 6, at 268; I1 id. at 627; IV
id at 598.
96. See IV id at 598.
97. See id.; II id. at 268; III id at 627. Thus, for example, the Commentary recognizes as
"inhuman treatment" measures which might completely cut off contact between civilian internees
or prisoners of war and the outside world and in particular their families, or which cause grave
injury to their human dignity. III id. at 627; IV id. at 598. The European Commission of Human
Rights has stated, on a number of occasions, that complete solitary confinement and isolation
can destroy the personality and thus may constitute inhuman treatment. See, e.g., RALPH
BEDDARD, HUMAN RIGHTS AND EUROPE 151 (3d ed. 1993).
It is important to note, however, that the term "inhuman treatment" is not to be identified
with "maltreatment." See 2B FINAL RECORD, supra note 29, at 31, 33.
98. See IV GENEVA CONVENTIONS COMMENTARY, supra note 6, at 204.
99. See discussion supra part III.B.l.a.
100. Greek Case, [1969 Greek Case] Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. at 186, ch. IV, para. 2; see
also BEDDARD, supra note 97, at 149. In a later report, the Commission explained that the use
of the expression "unjustifiable" was not intended to derogate from the absolute nature of the
prohibition on inhuman treatment; rather, it connotes the need to evaluate the specific
circumstances of each particular case. See Louise Doswald-Beck, What Does the Prohibition
of "Torture or Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment" Mean? The Interpretation
of the European Commission and Court of Human Rights, 25 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 24, 35-39
(1978).
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of Human Rights, without defining or describing the constitutive elements
of the concept of "inhuman treatment," emphasized several factors -
premeditation, long duration, intense physical and mental suffering, and
acute psychiatric disturbances - in its judgment in the case of Ireland
v. United Kingdom, concluding that the use of the "five techniques"
amounted to inhuman treatment of the detainees."0'
In a 1976 report, the European Commission arrived at the conclusion
that the failure to supply enough food and water or to provide necessary
medical treatment to detainees in the area of Cyprus occupied by Turkey,
as well as unpunished and unrepressed acts of rape committed by Turkish
soldiers in that area, amounted to inhuman treatment. 102
The prohibition of torture and inhuman treatment is usually accom-
panied by a prohibition of degrading treatment.3 Although such a
prohibition is absent from the list of grave breaches of the Conventions,
its absence seems to make little difference since, for the purposes and in
the context of the Conventions, and in light of the interpretation of the
concept of "inhuman treatment" in those Conventions, many acts which
might otherwise be categorized as degrading may be considered to
constitute inhuman treatment. An alternative formulation would be to
define such acts as coming within the category of "great suffering.""
Without purporting to classify all of the cases dealt with by the European Commission or
the European Court of Human Rights where the question arose as to whether Article 3 of the
European Human Rights Convention had been violated, some of the main categories of cases
are as follows:
(1) Detention and prison conditions, e.g., solitary confinement, psychiatric detention, and
disciplinary measures. See, e.g., BEDDARD, supra note 97, at 151-52, 153-55; FAWCETT,
supra note 75, at 47-48, 50-51.
(2) Corporal punishment, e.g., "birching." See BEDDARD, supra note 97, at 152-53; FAWCETr,
supra note 75, at 46-47. For comparisons with the U.S. case law regarding the Eighth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution ("cruel and unusual punishment"), see MARK W.
JANIS & RICHARD S. KAY, EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 134-39, 154-59 (1990).
(3) Deportation, expulsion, extradition, and political asylum. See, e.g., BEDDARD, supra note
97, at 155-58; FAWCETT, supra note 75, at 51-53.
101. See Ireland, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 66, para. 167; JANIS & KAY, supra note 100,
at 133-34; see generally id. at 117-42.
102. See ANTONIO CASSESE, HUMAN RIGHTS IN A CHANGING WORLD 95 (1990); see also
infra note 163.
103. The European Commission of Human Rights recognized treatment or punishment of
a person to be degrading if it "grossly humiliates him before others or drives him to act against
his will or conscience." Greek Case, [1969 Greek Case] Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. at 186, ch.
IV, para. 2. The European Court of Human Rights emphasized certain elements - feelings of
fear, anguish, and inferiority; humiliation and debasement; breaking physical or moral resistance
- in reaching the conclusion that the "five techniques" constituted "degrading treatment."
Ireland, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 66, para. 167.
104. See infra part III.C.
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c. A Brief Concluding Remark
Pouring substantive content into general terms such as "torture" or
"inhuman treatment" is no easy task. However, the obvious difficulties in
distinguishing torture from inhuman treatment ought not detract from the
fact that, in most cases, deciding whether a certain act comes within the
larger category of prohibited acts (whether torture, inhuman treatment, or
wilfully causing great suffering) will be a relatively straightforward
process. Only when a decision.is made that specific conduct under review
severely attacked the human dignity of a protected person does the
question of further classification of that act as torture, inhuman treatment,
or wilful suffering arise. Yet, determining whether certain acts committed
against protected persons, in the meaning of that term in the Conventions,
constitute the prohibited crime of torture or "merely" an inhuman act is
of great importance not only for the case at hand (such as when deciding
the proper punishment to be imposed on a convicted person) but also for
future purposes. Thus, for example, the decisions which the International
Tribunal is expected to hand down will carry an immense precedential
value for the development of international humanitarian and human rights
law as well as national criminal law. The Tribunal's decisions will also
have an educational significance for the general public which cannot be
overemphasized. Labeling certain acts as "torture" will thus underscore
their heinousness.
3. Biological Experiments
The prohibition in the Conventions against biological experiments is
clearly based on the horrific experience of World War II and seems to be
self-explanatory.
0 5
105. See IV GENEVA CONVENTIONS COMMENTARIES, supra note 6, at 598-99. The Com-
mentary clarifies that this prohibition does not apply to the use of new methods of treatment
by doctors if justified by medical reasons and based only on concern to improve the state of
health of the patient. Id.; III id. at 627-28; II id. at 269. The case of United States v. Brandt
et al., I TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE TIlE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS 3 (1950),
resulted in convictions for human experimentation on concentration camp inmates and prisoners
of war, as well as the notorious euthanasia program. The Court laid down ten principles for
scientific experimentation on human beings. See generally M. Cherif Bassiouni et al., The Crime
of Human Experimentation, in 1 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 6, at 399; Matthew
Lippman, The Nazi Doctors Trial and the International Prohibition on Medical Involvement
in Torture, 15 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 395 (1993).
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C. Wilfully Causing Great Suffering or Serious Injury
to Body or Health
The first part of this grave breach, "wilfully causing great suffer-
ing," complements the prohibition against torture and inhuman treat-
ment.1°6 According to the Commentary on the Conventions, the prohibi-
tion against causing great suffering is directed at situations where suffer-
ing is inflicted without the special purposes for which torture is carried
out,0 7 i.e., when the acts considered do not fall into this category. °8 In
any case, in view of the second part of the grave breach ("serious injury
to body or health"), it is clear that the suffering need not be of a physi-
cal nature, and mental suffering may be sufficient."° With.respect to the
term "serious injury to body or health" itself, the Commentary on the
Conventions refers to national penal codes since that term is usually to
be found in such codes." 0
D. Extensive Destruction and Appropriation of
Property, not Justified by Military Necessity
and Carried out Unlawfully and Wantonly
Unlike protected persons, the term "protected property" is not de-
fined in the Conventions. An examination of the specific provisions
incorporated in each of the Conventions reveals that there are some
types of property entitled to special protection:
(1) Hospitals and buildings of the Medical Service; am-
bulances, vehicles, and medical aircraft; and medical
equipment and material."'
106. Indeed, the point may be made here that similarity exists between acts causing great
suffering, as this term is to be construed for the purposes of Articles 50/51/130/147, and acts
constituting degrading treatment. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
107. Thus, for example, the suffering may be inflicted as a result of punishment,
revenge, sadism, or other motives. See II GENEVA CONVENTIONS COMMENTARY, supra note 6,
at 269; III id. at 268; IV id at 599.
108. See IV id. at 599; I id. at 372. The Commentary on the First Convention gives as
an example of such a grave breach mutilation of the wounded or exposure of the wounded to
useless and unnecessary suffering.
109. Id.
110. Id. The Commentary merely mentions that the length of time a victim is in-
capacitated for work is usually used as the measurement for the evaluation of the seriousness
of an injury.
111. See First Geneva Convention, supra note 4, chs. m, V, and VI, 6 U.S.T. at 3128,
3136, 3138, 75 U.N.T.S. at 32, 52, 54. In addition, the property of aid societies is to be




(2) Hospital ships; coastal rescue craft; medical transports; and
coastal medical installations;" 
2
(3) Civilian hospitals and their equipment; medical transports;
movable or immovable property (in occupied territories);
and food and medical supplies of the population (in oc-
cupied territories)."
3 .
The use of the term "extensive" signifies that it is not enough to
indicate an isolated incident of destruction or appropriation of protected
property." 4 However, two qualifications may be attached to such an
interpretation. First, the Commentary on the Fourth Geneva Convention
suggests that the bombing of a single civilian hospital would constitute
a grave breach if done intentionally." 5 Second, in some cases, such as the
destruction of hospital ships, other grave breaches of the Conventions may
be involved (for instance, wilful killing).1
6
What constitutes military necessity which might justify destruction or
appropriation' of property, even protected property, is a thorny question.
Generally speaking, the laws of war are based on balancing humanitarian
needs with the requirements of military necessity."' However, in the
specific case at hand, such balancing is explicitly left for a subsequent
determination." 9 Thus, two principal questions arise. First, what is the
scope and extent of "military necessity" which may justify the extensive
destruction and appropriation of property? Second, how should a
determination be made in each specific case?
112. See Second Geneva Convention, supra note 4, chs. III and V, 6 U.S.T. at 3226,
3242, 75 U.N.T.S. at 100, 108. Protection is also granted to neutral vessels under the provi-
sions of Articles 21 and 25 of the Second Convention. Id arts. 21 and 25, 6 U.S.T. at 3234,
3236, 75 U.N.T.S. at 100, 102.
113. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 4, arts. 18-22, 53, 55, and 57, 6 U.S.T. at
3530-32, 3552-54, 75 U.N.T.S. at 300-02, 322-24. The Third Geneva Convention does not
protect property as such.
114. See IV GENEVA CONVENTIONS COMMENTARY, supra note 6, at 601.
115. See IV id at 601 n.l.
116. See, e.g., II id. at 270.
117. Under the Fourth Geneva Convention, the requisitioning of civilian hospitals and their
material, as well as the requisitioning of foodstuff, is subject to certain additional restrictive
conditions not included in the term "military necessity."
118. See, e.g., Yoram Dinstein, Military Necessity, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA I98I, supra note
20, at 274, 274. Thus, even absolute prohibitions included in the laws of war represent the
outcome of such balancing. However, in certain cases, the laws of war may explicitly subject
a general prohibition of a certain conduct to an exception based on military necessity. See, e.g.,
N.C.H. Dunbar, Military Necessity in War Crimes Trials, 29 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 442, 452
(1952); William G. Downey, Jr., The Law of War and Military Necessity, 47 AM. J. INT'L L.
251, 262 (1953).
119. Dinstein, Military Necessity, supra note 118, at 274.
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As for the scope and content of military necessity which may justify
extensive destruction and appropriation of property, the Commentary on
the First Geneva Convention refers to Articles 33 to 36 of the Convention
as setting the limits for claims of military necessity."2 Those articles use
the term "urgent military necessity," which as the Commentary explains
connotes tactical considerations' 2 1 (when the need arises to use such
property by the forces in the field) or even extreme cases in which tactical
reasons may necessitate the destruction of such property.
122
With regard to real or personal property in occupied territories, Article
53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention proscribes its destruction, 123 except
where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military
operations.124 In the Commentary on the Fourth Geneva Convention, the
term "military operations" is tied to "imperative military requirements.' 25
120. I GENEVA CONVENTIONS COMMENTARY, supra note 6, at 372; II id. at 269-70.
121. See, e.g., Iid. at 275. Such tactical considerations are still subject to certain limitations
prescribed in the relevant articles, which derive from pure humanitarian needs.
122. See, e.g., Iid. at 276.
123. The article refers only to destruction of such property, since the Occupying Power
enjoys the right of requisitioning or confiscating property under defined conditions and
circumstances. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 4, art. 53, 6 U.S.T. at 3552, 75 U.N.T.S.
at 322.
124. Article 53 covers only property found in an occupied territory and does not, for
example, cover the destruction of property in enemy territory. For a broader prohibition, see
Hague Convention (IV), supra note 8, Annex (Regulations), art. 23(g), which provides that, "[i]t
is especially forbidden ... to destroy or seize the enemy's property, unless such destruction
or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war."
125. IV GENEVA CONVENTIONS COMMENTARY, supra note 6, at 302. Many writers support
a narrow reading of Article 53's exception for destruction made "absolutely necessary by
military operations." According to those writers, a broad construction of the exception might
do away with the basic prohibition. See, e.g., GERHARD VON GLAHN, THE OCCUPATION OF
ENEMY TERRITORY 225-27 (1957) (military necessity ought to be urgent and vital, contributing
in a decisive manner to ending the conflict or to the surrendering of the enemy; necessity proper
will be almost impossible to prove, except in a few minor situations during the initial combat
phases of the invasion of the enemy territory); 2 SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 21, at 244;
2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 414 (Hersch Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1952) ("[I]n every
case destruction must be 'imperatively demanded by the necessities of war', and must not merely
be the outcome of a spirit of plunder or revenge ...."); MORRIS GREENSPAN, THE MODERN
LAW OF LAND WARFARE 279-80 (1959) ("In judging actions of destruction and seizure of
property committed under a plea of military necessity, a fair standard to be applied in assessing
their justifiability would be that of their reasonableness .... In applying such a test due latitude
should be allowed for the stress under which men make their decisions in conducting military
operations, and they should be judged according to the conditions under which they operated,
rather than whether they would have made the same decision looking back on the matter from
the unhurried calm of court-room proceedings. Wanton destruction and seizure may be
distinguished from that which is necessary by the gross disparity between the extent of the
destruction and seizure and any valid reason for it.").
The scope of the expression "military operations" has been heavily debated in the context
of house demolitions by Israel in the territories which came under its control in 1967. Whereas
some (including the ICRC) believe that this expression refers only to actions taken by the armed
forces with a view to fighting, others (including the majority of justices of the Israeli Supreme
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Whatever that term means, the scope of what constitutes a grave breach
of the Conventions seems narrower than the prohibition envisioned by
Article 53. First, whereas Article 53 proscribes "any destruction," the
relevant grave breach of the Conventions arises when "extensive destruc-
tion" occurs. Second, the exception to the prohibition included in Article
53 is invoked in cases where the destruction of property was rendered
"absolutely necessary by military operations," as compared with "justified
by military necessity." However, this last discrepancy may in fact be
smaller than it at first appears due to the operation of such general
principles as reasonableness and proportionality. 126 Moreover, "extensive"
destruction may be harder to justify on the basis of "military necessity"
in certain circumstances and may require a stricter scrutiny of the military
reasons put forward as justification for such a destruction. Finally, the
question of destruction of property was dealt with by the IMT Charter and
by subsequent judgments of war criminals.
127
A second issue of great significance concerns how and who is to make
the determination as to whether "military necessity" existed and whether
it reached such a level as to justify an exception to the prohibition against
extensive destruction or appropriation of property. One possible view is
that the task of judging the weight to be accorded military requirements
in specific cases should be left entirely to the discretion of the state, which
Court) hold the opinion that "military operations" does not preclude considerations of deterrence
and counterguerrilla action. See, e.g., Cheryl V. Reicin, Preventive Detention, Curfews,
Demolition of Houses, and Deportations: An Analysis of Measures Employed by Israel in the
Administered Territories, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 515,546-53 (1987); Usama R. Halabi, Demolition
and Sealing of Houses in the Israeli Occupied Territories: A Critical Legal Analysis, 5 TEMPLE
INT'L & COMP. L.J. 251 (1991); Martin B. Carroll, The Israeli Demolition of Palestinian Houses
in the Occupied Territories: An Analysis of its Legality in International Law, 11 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 1195 (1990) (see especially id. at 1210-11, quoting Letter by the Director of the Department
of Principles and Law at the ICRC); Meir Shamgar, The Observance of International Law in
the Administered Territories, 1 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTs. 262, 275-76; Dan Simon, The Demolition
of Homes in the Israeli Occupied Territories, 19 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (1994).
126. See, e.g., IV GENEVA CONVENTIONS COMMENTARY, supra note 6, at 302; Dinstein,
Military Necessity, supra note 118, at 275. One obvious example of clearly prohibited acts is
"widespread destruction of villages by systematically burning them to the ground and blowing
up all the houses and structures in a given area," the purpose of which is "to eradicate cultural,
social and religious traces that identify the ethnic and religious groups." See Report of the
Commission of Experts, supra note 82, para. 136. See also, GREENSPAN, supra note 125, at
285-86 (devastation for the purpose of intimidating the civilian population or in an attempt to
damage the territory permanently or for a long period is illegal).
127. Article 6(b) of the IMT Charter provides, inter alia, that the wanton destruction of
cities, towns, or villages or devastation not justified by military necessity are to be considered
as war crimes. IMT Charter, supra note 19, art. 6(b), 82 U.N.T.S. at 288. However, in some
of the trials before military tribunals at the end of World War II, German commanders were
not held criminally responsible for adopting a "scorched earth" policy when forced to retreat
from an occupied territory. See VON GLAHN, supra note 125, at 228; Dunbar, supra note 118,
at 449-52.
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might invoke a claim of "military necessity." Such an approach might
lead, of course, to rendering meaningless the safeguards incorporated into
the Conventions with regard to protected property. This approach is
similar to the argument that a state claiming self-defense is alone com-
petent to decide the legitimacy of this claim. 28 This argument was
explicitly rejected in the judgment of the IMT, which stated that "whether
an action taken under the claim of self-defense was in fact aggressive or
defensive must ultimately be subject to investigation and adjudication if
international law is ever to be enforced.' 29
Another approach, posited as the opposite to the first, is that it is up
to the court or tribunal before which a specific case is brought to decide
those issues, without giving any weight to the position of the state on the
matter.130 A third possible approach may resemble the "margin of ap-
preciation" doctrine developed by the European Commission and Court
of Human Rights. Under this doctrine, the tribunal will review the claims
of military necessity put forward by a state but will accord some margin
of appreciation to that state in such matters on the grounds that the state
understands better the specific conditions prevailing in a territory which
it occupies.131 If this approach is adopted, a further determination will have
128. Such argument was made by some Nazi leaders during the proceedings at Nuremberg.
A somewhat similar position was asserted by the United States to justify the withdrawal of its
acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, following that
Court's ruling against the United States on jurisdictional issues involved in the Nicaragua case.
See Oscar Schachter, Self-Defense and the Rule of Law, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 259, 262 (1989).
129. Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 18, at 207. See also Schachter, supra note 128, at
260-63; YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 203-06 (2d ed. 1994); J.L.
BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 407-08 (6th ed. 1963); 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 422-23 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992).
130. Taking into consideration the fact that the Conventions foresaw the implementation
of the principle of universal jurisdiction by national courts, such an approach seems unrealistic
(e.g., national courts of State A determining whether military necessity existed in State B,
without regard to the position of State B on the matter). Such an approach might not be more
practicable when made with regard to international tribunals. It seems unlikely that such
tribunals would choose to disregard the position of the relevant state in this matter, as the
tribunal's jurisdiction is likely to be based upon state consent and thus subject to withdrawal
by aggrieved state parties.
131. For literature concerning the "margin of appreciation" doctrine, see, e.g., Cora S.
Feingold, The Doctrine of Margin of Appreciation and the European Convention on Human
Rights, 53 NOTRE DAME LAW. 90 (1977); Joan F. Hartman, Derogation from Human Rights
Treaties in Public Emergencies -A Critique of Implementation by the European Commission
and Court of Human Rights and the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations, 22
HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (1981); Rosalyn Higgins, Derogations Under Human Rights Treaties, 48
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 281 (1977); L.C. Green, Derogation of Human Rights in Emergency
Situations, 16 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 92 (1978); Clovis C. Morrisson, Jr., Margin of Apprecia-
tion in European Human Rights Law, 6 HuM. RTs. J. 263 (1973).
Relating to the evaluation of claims of military necessity put forward by occupation
authorities, von Glahn remarks that "[tihe judgment of the occupation authorities has to be
measured against the known facts and, if at all possible, against any evidence that there
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to be made as to the breadth and scope of the margin of appreciation to
be granted.
E. Compelling a Prisoner of War or a Protected Person
to Serve in the Forces of a Hostile Power
The prohibition on "compelling a prisoner of war or a protected
person to serve in the forces of a hostile power" seems to be straightfor-
ward. A note should be taken of Article 51 of the Fourth Geneva Con-
vention, which prohibits a belligerent from compelling protected persons
to serve in its armed or auxiliary forces, as well as from using pressure
or propaganda with the intention of securing voluntary enlistment. 32
F. Wilfully Depriving a Prisoner of War or a Protected Person
of the Rights of Fair and Regular Trial as Prescribed
in the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions
Several articles in the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions lay down
basic guarantees directed at assuring a protected'person or a prisoner of
war a fair and regular trial.
33
G. Unlawful Deportation or Transfer of a Protected Person
The grave breach of unlawful deportation or transfer of a protected
person appears only in Article 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. It
is important to note that the prohibition enshrined in this article relates to
the unlawful transfer or deportation of persons protected under that
Convention. Thus, for example, it does not cover the deportation or
transfer of a deporting state's own nationals.I"
Article 45 of the Fourth Geneva Convention deals with a range of
issues concerning the transfer of protected persons to another power.
35
existed an honest conviction to the effect that necessity proper existed." VON GLAHN, supra
note 125, at 226.
132. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 4, art. 51, 6 U.S.T. at 3550-52, 75 U.N.T.S.
at 320-22. Similar prohibitions are included in the Regulations annexed to the Hague Con-
vention (IV). See Hague Convention (IV), supra note 8, Annex (Regulations), arts. 23(h) and
52; see also Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 4, art. 40, 6 U.S.T. at 3542-44, 75
U.N.T.S. at 312-14; 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 125, at 440-41.
133. See especially Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 4, arts. 71-75, 126, 6 U.S.T.
at 3562-66, 3602, 75 U.N.T.S. at 332-34; Third Geneva Convention, supra note 4, arts. 87,
99-108, 6 U.S.T. at 3384, 3392-98, 75 U.N.T.S. at 202, 210-18. Among the basic guarantees
are the opportunity to present a defense and the right to be assisted by a qualified advocate or
counsel.
134. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 4, art. 147, 6 U.S.T. at 3618, 75 U.N.T.S. at
388; see infra note 141.
135. Article 45 provides that:
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This article is directed at preventing a belligerent from evading its
obligations and responsibilities under the Convention by transferring
protected persons to a state which is not bound by the Convention. 136 It
is important to note that this article is found in Section II of Part III of
the Convention, which deals with aliens within the territory of a party to
the conflict.
137
Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits forcible
transfers and deportations of protected persons from an occupied terri-
tory.
1 38
Protected persons shall not be transferred to a Power which is not a party to the
Convention.
This provision shall in no way constitute an obstacle to the repatriation of protected
persons, or to their return to their. country of residence after the cessation of
hostilities.
Protected persons may be transferred by the Detaining Power only to a Power which
is a party to the present Convention and after the Detaining Power has satisfied itself
of the willingness and ability of such transferee Power to apply the present Conven-
tion. If protected persons are transferred under such circumstances, responsibility for
the application of the present Convention rests on the Power accepting them, while
they are in its custody. Nevertheless, if that Power fails to carry out the provisions
of the present Convention in any important respect, the Power by which the protected
persons were transferred shall, upon being so notified by the Protecting Power, take
effective measures to correct the situation or shall request the return of the protected
persons. Such request must be complied with.
In no circumstances shall a protected person be transferred to a country where he or
she may have reason to fear persecution for his or her political opinions or religious
beliefs.
The provisions of this Article do not constitute an obstacle to the extradition, in pur-
suance of extradition treaties concluded before the outbreak of hostilities, of protected
persons accused of offences against ordinary criminal law.
Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 4, art. 45, 6 U.S.T. at 3546, 75 U.N.T.S. at 314-16.
"Transfer" is broadly construed to include any movement of protected persons to another
state, carried out by the Detaining Power on an individual or collective basis. IV GENEVA
CONVENTIONS COMMENTARY, supra note 6, at 266.
136. IV GENEVA CONVENTIONS COMMENTARY, supra note 6, at 266. It is clear that the
prohibition of transfers applies at least as forcefully to transfers of protected persons to the
control of groups such as independent paramilitary units.
137. Thus, transfer of aliens to a power not party to the Conventions is prohibited, whether
executed on an individual or collective basis. The Commentary on the Fourth Geneva
Convention distinguishes, however, between (1) the deportation of such aliens "in individual
cases when State security demands such action" and (2) their mass deportation. While the former
is considered permissible, the latter is not. See id.
138. Article 49 states as follows:
Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from
occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or to that of any other
country, occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their motive.
Nevertheless, the Occupying Power may undertake total or partial evacuation of a
given area if the security of the population or imperative military reasons so demand.
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The question of whether deportations of protected persons from
occupied territories are legal has received much attention in relation to the
territories which came under Israeli control after the 1967 War. 3 9 It is
important to note, however, that all the participants in this debate agree
that the Conventions prohibit mass, as opposed to individual, deporta-
tions."1° The Conventions were drafted with the horrors of the Nazi regime
Such evacuations may not involve the displacement of protected persons outside the
bounds of the occupied territory except when for material reasons it is impossible
to avoid such displacement. Persons thus evacuated shall be transferred back to their
homes as soon as hostilities in the area in question have ceased.
The Occupying Power undertaking such transfers or evacuations shall ensure, to the
greatest practicable extent, that proper accommodation is provided to receive the
protected persons, that the removals are effected in satisfactory conditions of hygiene,
health, safety and nutrition, and that members of the same family are not separated.
The Protecting Power shall be informed of any transfers and evacuations as soon as
they have taken place.
The Occupying Power shall not detain protected persons in an area particularly
exposed to the dangers of war unless the security of the population or imperative
military reasons so demand.
The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population
into the territory it occupies.
Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 4, art. 49, 6 U.S.T. at 3548, 75 U.N.T.S. at 318.
139. For an exposition of the conflicting views on this subject, see, e.g., HCJ 785/87,
845/87, 27/88, Affo and Others v. Commander of I.D.F. Forces in the West Bank and Others,
reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 139 (1990) (Isr. High Ct. of Just. 1990). The following are some of the
recent academic writings on this issue: Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Deportation and Transfer of
Civilians in Time of War, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 469 (1993); Ruth Lapidoth, The
Expulsion of Civilians from Areas which came under Israeli Control in 1967: Some Legal Issues,
2 EuRo. J. INT'L L. 97 (1990); John L. Habib, Israeli Deportations of Palestinians Under
International Law, 4 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 133 (1990); Benham Dayanim, The Israeli Supreme
Court and Deportations of Palestinians: The Interaction of Law and Legitimacy, 30 STAN. J.
INT'L L. 115 (1994). See also Shamgar, supra note 125, at 273-75.
140. The contours of the main arguments concerning the question of the legality of
individual deportations from occupied territories, see supra note 139, may be delineated as
follows: the proponents of an approach to regard individual deportations as permissible rely on
the intent of the drafters of Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, thus emphasizing the
desire to ban explicitly mass deportations such as had been executed by the Nazi regime. The
proponents of this argument also point to Article 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which
refers to "unlawful deportations," to show that certain deportations are considered to be lawful.
See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 4, art. 147, 6 U.S.T. at 3616, 75 U.N.T.S. at 386.
On the other hand, opponents of such a view point to the plain text of paragraph 1 of
Article 49 (which prohibits "individual" as well as mass forcible transfers and deportations) and
argue that, although the primary purpose of Article 49 was to prohibit mass deportations, it
cannot be considered to be the sole purpose of that article. According to this view, the
prohibition of the first paragraph of Article 49 is absolute (subject only to the exception included
in paragraph 2). This view is supported by the language "regardless of their motive" -
indicating the totality of the prohibition. See id. art. 49, 6 U.S.T. at 3458, 75 U.N.T.S. at 318.
Both sides to this debate agree that the main purpose of Article 49 was to prohibit
explicitly practices of mass deportations and forcible transfers.
Spring 19951
Michigan Journal of International Law
still fresh in memory. The mass transfers and deportations of millions of
people to concentration and death camps or to forced labor service 41 were
clearly the impetus behind the prohibition included in paragraph 1 of
Article 49.142
There are three additional points for consideration related to depor-
tations as grave breaches. First, Article 49 does not, as such, prohibit
voluntary transfer of protected persons from occupied territories. 43 Second,
views differ on whether a forcible transfer within an occupied territory of
protected persons is a violation of Article 49.'4 Third, since Article 147
of the Fourth Geneva Convention deals only with acts committed against
protected persons, it seems that a violation by an Occupying Power of
paragraph 6 of Article 49 of the Convention 145 does not constitute a "grave
breach" of the Convention.'4
H. Unlawful Confinement of a Protected Person
The Commentary on the Fourth Geneva Convention suggests that, in
view of the extended powers granted to Occupying Powers under the
Convention with regard to the confinement, internment, and detention of
protected persons, it would be difficult to prove the illegal nature of
confinement. 47 However, arbitrary confinement would constitute a grave
breach of the Convention. 48
141. Article 6(b) of the IMT Charter made it clear that deportation to slave-labor or for
any other purpose was a war crime. Moreover, Article 6(c) recognized deportations of civilian
population to be a crime against humanity. See IMT Charter, supra note 19, art. 6(b), (c), 82
U.N.T.S. at 288.
The IMT ruled that the German mass deportation practices, in which "whole populations
were deported to Germany for the purposes of slave labour upon defence works, armament
production and similar tasks connected with the war effort," constituted a war crime and a crime
against humanity. See Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 18, at 225, 239-43; OPPENHEIM, supra
note 125, at 441-42 (apart from the systematic extermination of large sections of the population
in occupied territory, mass deportations for forced labor constituted the principal war crime of
Germany in the course of World War II); GREENSPAN, supra note 125, at 268-69.
142. See IV GENEVA CONVENTIONS COMMENTARY, supra note 6, at 278-79.
143. The case in mind was that of ethnic or political minorities' suffering persecution or
discrimination and expressing a wish to leave the occupied territories because of the persecution
or discrimination. See id. at 279.
144. See, e.g., COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 56, at 1000 n.28
and the cites therein.
145. "The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population
into the territory it occupies." Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 4, art. 49(6), 6 U.S.T. at
3548, 75 U.N.T.S. at 318.
146. Such a violation was specifically made a grave breach under Article 85(4)(a) of
Protocol I. Protocol I, supra note 5, art. 85(4)(a), 16 I.L.M. at 1427.
147. IV GENEVA CONVENTIONS COMMENTARY, supra note 6, at 599. An Occupying Power
enjoys broad powers of arrest and administrative detention of persons in the occupied territories.
148. Id.; see also, GREENSPAN, supra note 125, at 171 (illegal arrest and detention is a war
crime, as are indiscriminate mass arrests for the purpose of terrorizing the population). Arbitrary
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I. Taking of Hostages
Article 34 of the Fourth Geneva Convention puts in place a categorical
and absolute prohibition against the taking of hostages. 149 According to
the Commentary on the Convention, the term "hostages" ought to be
interpreted in the widest possible sense in order to foster the principle of
individual responsibility and the corollary prohibition on collective
punishment. 150 The article is especially directed at the taking of hostages
as a means of intimidating the population in order to weaken its spirit of
resistance and to prevent breaches of the law, to ensure the execution of
orders given by the armed forces of the Power holding the hostages, and,
in general, to ensure the safety and security of the armed forces of that
Power. 151
The examples given by the Commentary as acts in violation of the
prohibition on the taking of hostages are based upon the dreadful ex-
perience of the two World Wars:
152
detention is prohibited in a long line of international documents. See, e.g., International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 70, art. 9, 999 U.N.T.S. at 175; Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, supra note 70, art. 9, at 73; European Convention on Human Rights, supra
note 70, art. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. at 226; American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 70,
art. 7(3), O.E.A. T.S. No. 36, at 3, 9 I.L.M. at 677; African Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights, supra note 70, art. 6, at 21 I.L.M. at 60. See also Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp.
1531, 1541 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (prohibition of arbitrary detention forms part of customary
international law); Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1388 (10th Cir. 1981)
(no principle of international law is more fundamental than the concept that human beings
should be free from arbitrary imprisonment).
149. Article 34 states that: "The taking of hostages is prohibited." Fourth Geneva
Convention, supra note 4, art. 34, 6 U.S.T. at 3540, 75 U.N.T.S. at 310; see also IV GENEVA
CONVENTIONS COMMENTARY, supra note 6, at 231; International Convention Against the Taking
of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 11,081. Article 6(b) of the IMT Charter listed the
killing of hostages among the war crimes over which the IMT had jurisdiction. IMT Charter,
supra note 19, art. 6(b), 82 U.N.T.S. at 288. See also Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 18, at
230. The motive for the taking of hostages is immaterial. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Hostages,
in 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA I981, supra note 20, at 264, 267. In the past, taking hostages had been a
lawful means of enforcing the laws of war against a hostile party to a conflict. See Draper, War,
supra note 21, at 324; 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 125, at 589-90.
150. IV GENEVA CONVENTIONS COMMENTARY, supra note 6, at 230; 2 OPPENHEIM, supra
note 125, at 591.
151. IV GENEVA CONVENTIONS COMMENTARY, supra note 6, at 229-30. Bassiouni suggests
-the following as a definition of "hostage": "[A] person forcefully detained by another without
legal authority or in violation of national or international law for purposes of extracting from
that person or another a ransom or concession." M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Crime of Kidnapping
and Hostage Taking, in I INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 6, at 475, 475.
152. See IV GENEVA CONVENTIONS COMMENTARY, supra note 6, at 230. Indeed, in several
of the twelve trials of war criminals held under Control Council Law No. 10 subsequent to the
Nuremberg Trial of the major war criminals, the courts held the killing of hostages to be a war
crime. See, e.g., United States v. List, 11 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG
MILITARY TRIBUNALS 757 (1950) (issue was the taking of hostages and killing of civilians by
way of reprisals for attacks on German troops by partisans); GREENSPAN, supra note 125, at
413-17.
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(1) Taking as hostages prominent persons in a city or a district
in order to prevent disorders or attacks on the armed forces
of the Detaining Power;
(2) After an attack, arresting inhabitants and announcing that
they will be held captive or executed if the guilty persons
do not turn up;
(3) Taking of hostages in order to guarantee the life of persons
held hostage by the adverse Party;
(4) Holding hostages in order to obtain the delivery of food-
stuffs and supplies or the payment of an indemnity; and
(5) Taking accompanying hostages to prevent attack on convoys.
IV. THE CRIME OF RAPE AS A GRAVE
BREACH OF THE CONVENTIONS
In light of persistent reports of rape of women as an instrument of
terror in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, and allegations of such
rape on a massive and systematic basis as a method for "ethnic cleansing,"
it is imperative to examine whether the crime of rape may be considered
a "grave breach" of the Conventions." 3
The crime of rape is not explicitly included in common Articles
50/51/130/147 of the Conventions. There can be little doubt that different
violations of the norms of international humanitarian law are as severe as
those designated "grave breaches. ' m Moreover, the list of grave breaches
is not exclusive in so far as war crimes are concerned - the range of
recognized war crimes extends beyond that which is covered by "grave
breaches." Yet, the list is exhaustive in the sense that acts not enumerated
in it cannot be considered as "grave breaches" of the Conventions,
regardless of their own severity.
1 55
Despite the Nazi and Japanese practices of forced prostitution and rape
during World War II, the IMT did not deal with the crime of rape.1
5 6
153. The term "rape" should be understood in this context to encompass the broader
spectrum of acts of grave sexual violence (e.g., forced prostitution and forced impregnation).
See, e.g., Report of the Commission of Experts, supra note 82, para. 103; id. paras. 241-53
(patterns of rape examined in the context of "ethnic cleansing").
154. See, e.g., I GENEVA CONVENTIONS COMMENTARY, supra note 6, at 371; I1 id. at 624;
COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 56, at 991; R6ling, supra note 20,
at 212.
155. See, e.g., G.I.A.D. Draper, The Modern Patterns of War Criminality, 6 ISR. Y.B. HUM.
RTS. 9, 28 (1976).
156. In the proceedings before the Tokyo Tribunal, evidence of rape and "violence against
women" was considered as one of the factors to support convictions of war criminals. See 20
R. JOHN PRITCHARD & SONIA M. ZAIDE, THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL (1987) (judgment);
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However, the gravity of rape is illustrated by the recognition of it as .a
crime against humanity. Thus, under Article ll(1)(c) of the Control
Council Law No. 10, rape was included in the list of crimes against
humanity. 5 7 This is also the case under Article 5(g) of the Statute of the
International Tribunal.' 58 Such an act is also specifically prohibited under
both the Fourth Geneva Convention 9 and the Additional Protocols.' °
Although not explicitly mentioned, rape qualifies under two prongs
of the categories defining grave breaches of the Conventions. First, the
language "wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or
health" seems to cover acts of rape. Indeed, that is the opinion expressed
by the ICRC.1
61
Second, it seems that the act of rape falls into the category of "torture
or inhuman treatment." Rape may specifically violate the international
prohibitions against "torture" under certain circumstances, such as when
rape is a politically (rather than purely privately) motivated crime. 62 Even
id. at 49, 814-16, 49, 788-92. It is noteworthy that the indictment for the Tokyo Tribunal
included, in the description of charges against the defendants accused of "violation of recognized
customs and conventions of war," the following offenses, among others: "mass murder, rape,
pillage, brigandage, torture and other barbaric cruelties upon the helpless civilian population
of the over-run countries." 1 id. at 1 (Indictment).
See also Rhonda Copelon, Surfacing Gender: Reconceptualizing Crimes against Women
in Time of War, in MASS RAPE - THE WAR AGAINST WOMEN IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA 197,
197 (Alexandra Stiglmayer ed., 1994). In the list of offenses in violation of the laws and
customs of war, prepared by the 1919 Commission established to inquire into violations of
international law, see supra note 12, rape was included as the fifth item.
In fact, the notorious practices of forced prostitution and rape during World War II seem
to form the tip of an iceberg concerning the often ignored phenomenon of acts of rape during
wars and armed conflicts. See, e.g., SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN
AND RAPE 31-113 (1975).
157. Control Council Law No. 10, reprinted in 1 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NUREMBERG TRIBUNAL xvi, xvii (1950).
158. Statute of the International Tribunal, supra note 1, art. 5(g), 32 I.L.M. at 1194.
159. See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 4, art. 27, 6 U.S.T. at 3536, 75 U.N.T.S.
at 306.
160. See Protocol I, supra note 5, arts. 76(1) and 85, 16 I.L.M. at 1425, 1427-28. See also
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Noninternational Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, art. 4(2)(e), U.N. Doc.
A/32/144/Annex II, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1442, 1444 (1977).
161. See ICRC, Aide-Memoire of December 3, 1992, cited in Theodor Meron, Rape as
a Crime Under International Humanitarian Law, 87 Am. J. INT'L L. 424, 426 (1993).
162. This indeed seems to be the case with regard to acts of rape committed in the territory
of the former Yugoslavia since 1991. See, e.g., Copelon, supra note 156, at 201-02; Meron,
Rape as a Crime, supra note 161, at 426 (act of rape as "torture or inhuman treatment" in
certain circumstances); Affidavit, supra note 92; Blatt, supra note 82, at 853-64 (rape as torture
when fulfilling the elements recognized as constitutive to an act of torture under Article I of
the Convention Against Torture); Kooijmans Report, supra note 72; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL,
WOMEN IN THE FRONT LINE (1990); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, RAPE AND SEXUAL ABUSE:
TORTURE AND ILL-TREATMENT OF WOMEN IN DETENTION (1991) (rape in detention and under
military occupation is torture). Although not explicitly recognized as such, it seems that the
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when doubt exists as to whether rape in specific circumstances amounts
to torture, there is no doubt that rape qualifies as inhuman treatment.
63
As mentioned above,164 the term "inhuman treatment" ought to be
interpreted in the context of those articles of the Conventions dealing with
treatment of protected persons. Such articles, for instance, Article 27 of
the Fourth Geneva Convention, explicitly protect women against rape.'
65
Indeed, even without such an explicit prohibition, it seems clear that the
act of rape gravely violates the protections granted to protected persons
under the Conventions: it cannot be seen as commensurate with respect
for the person, honor, or family rights of protected persons; it violates the
dictate requiring that protected persons be humanely treated; and exposes
such persons to violence or, at the least, to threats of violence.
Third, several states recognized the crime of rape as constituting a
grave breach of the Conventions (and a war crime stricto sensu or a crime
against humanity).'66 Indeed, under Article 142 of the 1976 Criminal Code
of the Republic of Yugoslavia, "forced prostitution or rape" are
enumerated in a list of "war crimes against civilian population" which is
based on (but not limited to) the list of grave breaches of the Conven-
tions.' 67
There are important implications to regarding the crime of rape as
constituting a grave breach of the Conventions (or for that matter, a war
Commission of Experts, established pursuant to Security Council's Resolution 780, subscribes
to this view. See, e.g., Report of the Commission of Experts, supra note 82, para. 135
("indiscriminate killings, rape and sexual assaults, and other forms of torture committed against
civilians and prisoners of war") (emphasis added). A possible counterargument may be based
on the separate mention of rape and torture in Article 5 of the Statute of the International
Tribunal, but, of course, a certain degree of overlap exists among the different categories of
crimes enumerated in Article 5.
163. See, e.g., Affidavit, supra note 92, at 26-27, 34; Dorothy Q. Thomas & Regan E.
Ralph, Rape in War: Challenging the Tradition of Impunity, 1994 SAIS REv. 81; O'Brien, supra
note 21, at 645; Cyprus v. Turkey, 4 EUR. H.R. REP. 482, 537 (1982) (recognizing acts of rape
committed by Turkish soldiers in Cyprus to be "'inhuman treatment,"' although not recognizing
them as torture); Report of the Commission of Experts, supra note 82, paras. 105, 109.
Without detracting from the gravity of the act of rape itself, in many cases the actual rape
is a core of a "cluster of violence," accompanied by other acts of violence which can, standing
on their own, constitute a grave breach of the Conventions.
164. See discussion supra part HI.B.2.a.
165. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 4, art. 27, 6 U.S.T. at 3536, 75 U.N.T.S. at
306. One of the questions which arises in this context is whether the crime of rape ought to be
considered as an offense against honor (as it is characterized in Article 27) or rather as an
offense of a distinct violent character. It is important to note that the two are not mutually
exclusive. See Thomas & Ralph, supra note 163, at 91-92, 98; Copelon, supra note 156, at
200-01.
166. See Meron, Rape as a Crime, supra note 161, at 427.
167. See supra note 49.
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crime under customary international law), 66 along with its enumeration
in a list of crimes against humanity. As explained above,' 69 war crimes
and grave breaches of the Conventions are easier to prove than crimes
against humanity. Recognizing the crime of rape as constituting a grave
breach or a war crime shifts the focus of attention from the massive and
systematic resort to such acts (and the need to prove such mass character
and planning) towards repression of each individual act of rape.
1 70
Moreover, identifying acts of rape as grave breaches would emphasize the
criminality of each particular act of rape (and the importance of each
single rape victim), standing on its own, independent of its being part of
a massive and systematic pattern.
Finally, considering 'rape as a grave breach of the Conventions is
consistent with recent international developments toward a growing
recognition of crimes against women coupled with attempts to uproot such
crimes.' 71 If the International Tribunal, in the cases coming before it,
decides to label rape as a grave breach, its decision will put a definitive
seal of intolerance on violence against women as well as open the door
for effective remedies on the national level against the perpetrators of such
acts through the implementation of the universal jurisdiction which applies
to grave breaches. Such a development of international law is of special
significance in light of the fact that crimes and offenses against women
(whether as part of warfare or not) are not a phenomenon that started with
the armed conflict raging in the former Yugoslavia.1 72 The most novel
aspect in the current conflict with regard to attacks directed at women as
such is the wide publicity that such attacks have attracted, and the
subsequent international public outrage. This public awareness makes the
168. See Meron, Rape as a Crime, supra note 161, at 428. See generally Kathleen M. Pratt
& Laurel E. Fletcher, Time for Justice: The Case for International Prosecutions of Rape and
Gender-Based Violence in the Former Yugoslavia, 9 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 77 (1994); Denise
Aydelott, Mass Rape During War: Prosecuting Bosnian Rapists Under International Law, 7
EMORY INT'L L. REV. 585 (1993); Laurel Fletcher et al., Human Rights Violations Against
Women, 15 WHITrIER L. REv. 319 (1994); Elizabeth A. Kohn, Rape as a Weapon of War:
Women's Human Rights During the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, 24 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV.
199 (1994); Judith Gardam, Gender and Non-Combatant Immunity, 3 TRANSNAT'L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 345 (1993); Arden B. Levy, International Prosecution of Rape in Warfare:
Nondiscriminatory Recognition and Enforcement, 4 U.C.L.A. WOMEN'S L.J. 255 (1994).
169. See supra note 20.
170. The same act of rape, of course, may be both a crime against humanity and a grave
breach of the Conventions. See Thomas & Ralph, supra note 163, at 84-88; Copelon, supra
note 156, at 205.
171. See, e.g., Vienna Declaration, June 25, 1993, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1661 (1993);
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, G.A. Res. 48/104, U.N. GAOR,
48th Sess., 85th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/104, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1049 (1994).
172. See, e.g., Fionnuala Nf Aoldin, The Entrenchment of Systematic Abuse: Mass Rape
in Former Yugoslavia, HARV. HUM. RTs. J. (forthcoming June 1995).
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time ripe for action to uproot crimes against women. It must not be
squandered.
V. PENALTIES FOR GRAVE BREACHES OF THE CONVENTIONS
One of the goals of the ICRC in putting forward the principle of
universality 73 was to ensure a higher degree of uniformity of punishment
and penalties for breaches of the Conventions. In fact, at the 1949
Diplomatic Conference, the issue of penalties for the different violations
of the Conventions was entrusted for study to the joint committee
responsible for considering the provisions common to the Conventions.1
74
No prescription of penalties has ever been included. Thus, it was left to
the High Contracting Parties to determine the specific penal sanctions to
be attached to each of the violations, including grave breaches, of the
Conventions. '7
In light of the above, and in order to maintain the principle of nulla
poena sine lege and avoid claims of a retroactive application of criminal
sanctions, Article 24(1) of the Statute of the International Tribunal
provides that in determining the terms of imprisonment, "the Trial
Chambers shall have recourse to the general practice regarding prison
sentences in the courts of the former Yugoslavia."176 It is important to
note, however, that such "general practice" is not determinative.
77
VI. THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS
AND THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
Is the mechanism of grave breaches, incorporated in the Conventions,
applicable to the armed conflict being waged in the territory of the former
173. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
,174. See IV GENEVA CONVENTIONS COMMENTARY, supra note 6, at 587.
175. See Meron, War Crimes Trials, supra note 39, at 126-27; Draper, The Geneva
Conventions, supra note 31, at 156. The ICRC has expressed a preference for the promulgation
of special domestic legislation defining breaches of the Conventions and providing for penalties
for each of those violations. As an alternative, it was proposed that such special legislation
would concentrate on defining and providing penalties for grave breaches of the Conventions,
while a general clause would deal with other violations of the Conventions. In any case, the
ICRC emphasized the need to specify in such legislation the penalty for each offense. See IV
GENEVA CONVENTIONS COMMENTARY, supra note 6, at 601-02; III id. at 629. The ICRC thus
rejected the pattern followed by the IMT Charter in so far as it left the question of penal
sanctions to the IMT without setting out any criteria for sentencing. See e.g., I ii, at 364 n.2.
176. Statute of the International Tribunal, supra note 1, art. 24(1), 32 I.L.M. at 1199.
177. See Meron, War Crimes Trials, supra note 39, at 127 (suggesting that the International
Tribunal should not exceed the penalties stated in national laws implementing the Conventions
in general and those in the laws of the former Yugoslavia in particular); Akhavan, supra note
40, at 280.
See also Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Tribunal, Rule 101 (adopted
on Feb. 11, 1994) (IT/32 of Mar. 14, 1994) (revised Jan. 1995) (on file with author).
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Yugoslavia? In what follows, the discussion will not focus on the applica-
tion of specific prohibitions to particular facts; rather, the question
examined is the applicability of the system of grave breaches, as a whole,
to the situation in that area.
The Conventions attempt to regulate certain aspects of conduct in
international conflicts. Thus, violations of common Article 3 of the
Conventions (the only article to deal with nonintemational armed conflict)
do not constitute grave breaches of the Conventions, regardless of their
gravity. 178 However, it is widely accepted that the armed conflict in the
former Yugoslavia is, in essence, of an international nature, thus clearing
the way for the application of the grave breaches system in relevant
cases.
179
All parties involved in the armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia
have in fact agreed to abide by the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I.
Thus, not only have they agreed to honor the obligations of the former
Yugoslavia under those Conventions, but they have also specifically
agreed to apply those Conventions to the armed conflict between them.1
0
178. See Meron, War Crimes Trials, supra note 39, at 127-28 (violations of common
Article 3 may give rise to charges of genocide or crimes against humanity but will not lead to
prosecution for grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions or for war crimes); Meron, War
Crimes in Yugoslavia, supra note 21, at 80-81; Report of the Commission of Experts, supra note
82, para. 42; Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity, supra note 21, at 475-76. For an opposing
view, see Jordan J. Paust, Applicability of International Criminal Laws to Events in the Former
Yugoslavia, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 499, 510-11 (1994) (grave breaches system is
applicable to violations of common Article 3).
179. Several arguments have been put forward to support the position that the armed
conflicts taking place in the territory of the former Yugoslavia are of an international character.
Among the arguments most frequently made in this context are: the involvement of Belgrade
in the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina; the recognition by foreign states of Slovenia, Croatia,
and Bosnia-Herzegovina and the admission of these new states to the U.N.; and the agreements
signed by all the parties to the armed conflicts regarding the application of the Geneva
Conventions to the armed conflicts between them. Indeed, the Statute of the International
Tribunal, and the report of the U.N. Secretary-General to the Security Council in which the
Statute was proposed and explained, clearly adopt this position. See Meron, War Crimes Trials,
supra note 39, at 128; Meron, War Crimes in Yugoslavia, supra note 21, at 81; Paust, supra
note 178, at 506-10; Report of the Commission of Experts, supra note 82, paras. 42-44, 306-07
(stating that the law applicable in international armed conflicts ought to apply to the entirety
of the armed conflicts in the territory of the former Yugoslavia). This view is clearly discernible
from the various Security Council resolutions related to the present armed conflict. See infra
note 180.
180. In a pact of November 27, 1991 (between Croatia and Serbia) and an accord of May
22, 1992 (between all parties involved in the armed conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina), the parties
agreed to apply certain provisions of the Geneva Conventions and of Protocol I, excluding,
however, those provisions dealing with grave breaches. Yet, all parties to the conflict accepted
the London "Statement of Principles" of August 26, 1992, concerning compliance with
international humanitarian law and personal responsibility for violations of the Conventions.
Meron, War Crimes Trials, supra note 39, at 129; Paust, supra note 178, at 500-03; Report of
the Commission of Experts, supra note 82, para. 108.
See also S.C. Res. 764, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3104th mtg., para. 10, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/764 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1465, 1467 (1992) (U.N. Security Council reaffirms
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Moreover, even without such agreements, the grave breaches regime
of the Conventions would have been applicable to violations of the
Conventions performed in the course of the armed conflict.' 81 Whether or
not the Conventions, as a whole, reflect and are part of customary
international law,'82 the case for such a position seems to be strongest in
the context of grave breaches of the Conventions. As mentioned above,
1 83
the list of grave breaches can be regarded as a codification of certain war
crimes previously recognized, first and foremost by the Nuremberg
Tribunal, to be part of customary international law.8 4
VII. GRAVE BREACHES UNDER PROTOCOL 1185
Protocol I (Section II, Part V) supplements the provisions of the
Conventions relating to the repression of breaches, while extending the
that "all parties are bound to comply with the obligations under international humanitarian law,
and in particular the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and that persons who commit or
order the commission of grave breaches of the Conventions are individually responsible in
respect of such breaches"); S.C. Res. 771, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3106th mtg., para. 1, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/771 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1470, 1471 (1992); S.C. Res. 787, U.N. SCOR,
47th Sess., 3137th mtg., para. 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/787 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1481,
1483 (1992). These resolutions, coupled with other major Security Council resolutions
concerning the armed conflict in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, see, e.g., S.C. Res. 770,
780, 808, and 827, reflect the Security Council's view of the situation as an international armed
conflict.
181. Assuming that this conflict is, indeed, of an international character.
182. See, e.g., Theodor Meron, The Geneva Conventions as Customary Law, 81 AM. J.
INT'L L. 348 (1987); Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 1, para. 35, 32 1.L.M. at 1170;
Report of the Commission of Experts, supra note 82, para. 53. For an opposite approach, see
Yoram Dinstein, Deportations from Occupied Territories, 13 TEL-Aviv U. L. REV. 403, 404
(1988) (Hebrew) (stating that the Fourth Geneva Convention is, in essence, of a constitutive,
rather than declarative, nature. It represented an innovation in international law when it was
drafted, and since 1949 only one state - Israel - has resorted to its provisions in a systematic
manner). In addition, it should be noted that the former Yugoslavia was a signatory to the 1949
Geneva Conventions.
183. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
184. In fact it may be argued that the prohibition of grave breaches has reached a status
ofjus cogens. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 72, § 702 cmt. n & rep. n.1; Paust, supra
note 178, at 504-05.
185. Although the focus of this paper is the grave breaches system under the Conventions,
it is important to discuss briefly the Additional Protocols in this context. Two main reasons may
be suggested here. First, the Protocols represent a development of the grave breaches system.
Second, in the context of the armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia, it ought to be noted
that the former Republic of Yugoslavia was a signatory not only to the 1949 Conventions, but
also to the Additional Protocols. It is noteworthy that the United States, through Ambassador
Madeleine K. Albright, expressed the view that "the 'laws or customs of war' referred to in
Article 3 [of the Statute of the International Tribunal] include all obligations under humanitarian
law agreements in force in the territory of the former Yugoslavia at the time the acts were com-
mitted, including ... the 1977 Additional Protocols to these Conventions." U.N. Doc.




application of that system of repression to breaches of the Protocol. 8 6 This
extension is in two areas. The first is the application of the concept of
"grave breaches" under the Conventions to acts committed against new
categories of persons and objects protected under Protocol J.187 The second
For an in depth analysis of the penal provisions of Protocol I, see COMMENTARY ON THE
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 56, at 973-1058; MICHAEL BOTHE ET AL., NEW RULES
FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 507-47 (1982); Solf & Cummings, supra note 45.
Brief mention ought to be made of the Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and
Security of Mankind, adopted by the International Law Commission at its forty-third session.
Article 22 of this Draft Code, entitled "Exceptionally Serious War Crimes," includes a list of
"exceptionally serious violation[s] of principles and rules of international law applicable in
armed conflict." Included in this list are the following:
(a) acts of inhumanity, cruelty or barbarity directed against the life, dignity
or physical or mental integrity of persons [,in particular wilful killing,
torture, mutilation, biological experiments, taking of hostages, compelling
a protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile Power, unjustifiable
delay in the repatriation of prisoners of war after the cessation of active
hostilities, deportation or transfer of the civilian population and collective
punishment];
(b) establishment of settlers in an occupied territory and changes to the
demographic composition of an occupied territory;
(c) use of unlawful weapons;
(d) employing methods or means of warfare which are intended or may be
expected to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural
environment;
(e) large-scale destruction of civilian property;
(f) wilful attacks on property of exceptional religious, historical or cultural
value.
Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Third Session, 2(2) Y.B.
Int'l L. Comm'n 1, 104-05, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1991/Add.1 (Part 2), reprinted in 30
I.L.M. 1563, 1591 (1991).
186. Proposals calling for a more stringent regime than offered by the Geneva Conventions
with regard to the repression of grave breaches were rejected. The main reason was the fact that
even the Conventions' grave breaches system had not been successfully implemented around
the world.
187. Article 85, paragraph 2 of Protocol I increases the number of situations in which acts,
already defined as grave breaches under the Geneva Conventions, would be considered as such.
Protocol I, supra note 5, art. 85, para. 2, 16 I.L.M. at 1428.
The list of the new categories of persons or objects to be protected by the grave breaches
provisions consists of the following:
(1) Persons who have taken part in hostilities and have fallen into the power of an
adverse Party (Combatants and prisoners of war under Article 44 and persons falling
into Article 45 of Protocol I);
(2) Refugees and stateless persons in the power of an adverse Party (persons with regard
to whom Article 73 of Protocol I applies);
(3) The wounded, sick, and shipwrecked of the adverse Party (see Article 8 of Protocol
I for definitions); and
(4) Medical or religious personnel, medical units or medical transports which are under
the control of the adverse Party and protected under the Protocol (see Article 8 for
definitions).
Some of these categories, although similar to those existing under the Conventions, are
substantially broader in their scope (e.g., the category of persons protected under Articles 44
and 45 of Protocol I).
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entails the expansion of the list of acts recognized as grave breaches.'88
In addition, the Protocol specifically qualifies grave breaches of the
Conventions and the Protocol as war crimes.8 9 Finally, Protocol I adopts
and supplements the system of repression found in the Conventions and
applies it to breaches of the Protocol.' 9°
Protocol I also deals with certain matters which were not covered
under the Conventions' regime, for example, responsibility arising out of
a failure to act when under a duty to do so and responsibility of com-
manders and superiors.'9 ' In addition, Protocol I seeks to foster the
principle of universal jurisdiction and to ensure that grave breaches would
not go unpunished: it emphasizes the duty of the High Contracting Parties
to afford mutual assistance in criminal matters as is necessary for the
prosecution of any grave breaches of either the Protocol or the Conven-
tions; it also deals with the thorny issue of extradition of perpetrators.192
An attempt made to include Article 75 of Protocol I in this list, in order to extend further
the categories of persons protected under the grave breaches provisions, was abandoned when
opponents feared that such inclusion might extend the concept of "grave breaches" to breaches
committed by a party to the conflict against its own nationals. See COMMENTARY ON THE
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 56, at 992-93.
188. See Protocol I, supra note 5, art. 11, para. 4, 16 I.L.M. at 1401, and art. 85, paras.
3-4, 16 I.L.M. at 1428. Paragraph 3 introduces a major conceptual extension of the system of
grave breaches in dealing with violations related to the conduct of hostilities, i.e., to that body
of law known as the "Hague law." Thus, paragraph 3 considers as grave breaches targeting
civilians and launching an indiscriminate attack with the knowledge that it will cause excessive
loss of life, injury to civilians, or damage to civilian objects. But see Bassiouni, Repression of
Breaches, supra note 39, at 200 (expanding the list of grave breaches dilutes the effect of
selecting certain breaches as grave breaches); Draper, Modern Patterns, supra note 155, at
36-40.
Paragraph 4 of Article 85 is more consistent with the traditional contours of the "Geneva
law," although some of its subparagraphs were the most controversial of all paragraphs included
in Article 85, due to what seemed to many to be their overriding political character which made
them unfit for a humanitarian document. Whereas paragraph 3 focuses on "battlefield crimes,"
paragraph 4 (with the exception of subparagraph (d)) concentrates on offenses committed against
persons under the control of a hostile Power. Thus, for example, included in paragraph 4 are
the unjustifiable delay in the repatriation of prisoners of war or civilians and apartheid.
189. See Protocol I, supra note 5, art. 85, para. 5, 16 I.L.M. at 1428, and art. 75, para. 7,
16 I.L.M. at 1424. On the connection between grave breaches and war crimes, see supra note
40 and accompanying text. These provisions do not affect the application or scope of either the
Geneva Conventions or Protocol I.
190. See Protocol I, supra note 5, art. 85, para. 1, 16 I.L.M. at 1427.
191. See id. arts. 86-87, 16 I.L.M. at 1428-29.
192. Id. art. 88, 16 I.L.M. at 1429. Also, Article 89 of Protocol I imposes upon the Parties
the duty, "in situations of serious violations of the Conventions or of this Protocol," to act in
cooperation with the United Nations and in conformity with the U.N. Charter. Id. art. 89, 16
I.L.M. at 1429.
Article 90 of Protocol I deals with an International Fact-Finding Commission. Id. art. 90,




International humanitarian law is facing serious challenges. Around
the world, violations of the most basic of its norms are perpetrated with
an alarming frequency. The manner in which the international community
chooses to respond to such violations - in legal and political means -
will substantially shape the direction, development, and relevance of
international humanitarian law in the years to come. It is in that normative
and prospective sense that the developments around the International
Tribunal are most significant. Whatever the outcome of the proceedings,
their significance goes far beyond the fate of the specific defendants. By
establishing the International Tribunal, the international community has
made an important step and set the stage for a crucial legal, political,
moral, and social precedent. It is yet to be seen what the substantive
content of that precedent is going to be.
The International Tribunal presents us with a golden opportunity,
which must not be squandered, to bolster the grave breaches system and
with it to promote the respect and relevance of the norms of international
humanitarian law. This process is one which is not confined to the
proceedings before the International Tribunal. Rather, it is incumbent on
each and every one of us to contribute to it. Morally, socially, politically,
and legally none can afford to say "I wasn't a Bosnian."
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